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Abstract
Can revenue sharing of resource rents be a source of distributive conflict? Can co-
hesive institutions avoid such conflicts? We exploit exogenous variation in local gov-
ernment revenues and new data on local democratic institutions in Nigeria to study
these questions. We find a strong link between rents and conflict. Conflicts are highly
organized and concentrated in districts and time-periods with unelected local govern-
ments. Once local governments are elected these relationships are much weaker. We
argue that elections produce more cohesive institutions that help limit distributional
conflict between groups. Throughout, we confirm these findings using individual
level survey data.
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1 Introduction
The peaceful division of scarce resources is a distinguishing feature of successfully
functioning states. A country’s political system and its cohesiveness are important for
managing resource allocation. A lack of cohesiveness – the failure of different social
groups to be meaningfully represented in institutions – has been identified as a key fea-
ture that may explain the emergence of fragile and low income development clusters
(Besley and Persson, 2011a). Natural resource rents – relative to other sources of govern-
ment revenue – are particularly prone to trigger violence through a multitude of channels
(Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Caselli et al., 2015; Berman et al., 2017). Such rents are dis-
tinguishable from other revenues because they are windfall profits that mostly directly
accrue to the state, as opposed to being indirectly sourced through taxation. Windfall
profits encourage rent-seeking behavior and this contest for rents may involve violence
(van der Ploeg, 2011) and is associated with repressive regimes, rentier states and clien-
telism (Brollo et al., 2013; Besley and Persson, 2011; Carreri and Dube, 2017).
Understanding why some countries suffer a resource curse can inform the design of
institutions (Ross, 2015). Leveraging the framework of Besley and Persson (2011), we
study three questions. First, do large windfalls of politically controlled resource rents
trigger violence to contest (or enforce exclusion) from these rents? Second, are elected
(vis-a-vis appointed) local governments more successful in discouraging the use of vio-
lence to contest rents? Third, to what extent does variation in the degree of cohesiveness
that these different institutional setups generate explain why violence is being used to
contest rents in one, but not the other regime.
Our answers provide ample evidence to support the theoretical predictions of Besley
and Persson (2011). Further, we confirm an important proposition that has been left
unexplored: do cohesive institutions discourage the use of political violence? Besley
and Persson (2011)’s results strongly depend on a single model parameter capturing the
extent to which institutions are constraining incumbents. Less cohesion implies that more
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resources are diverted away from common public goods, and towards patronage and
clientelism, generating a unique value for a group holding political power. Through
this channel, investments in capacities to forcefully retain power (incumbent) or gain
access to it (opposition) can be rationalized. With fully cohesive institutions, the sharp
predictions break down: the more cohesive institutions are, the less likely it is that revenue
shocks will induce investments in political violence. The key role that the cohesiveness
of institutions plays has not been properly empirically studied due to a lack of time-
variation in institutions. This paper fills this gap. There are at least three challenges to
finding a context that maps well into the theoretical framework and allows for a clean test
of the theoretical predictions. First, natural resources can cause conflict through many
direct and indirect channels, posing a significant challenge for non-experimental studies
to causally identify any specific individual channel.1 Second, there are few cases where
countries exhibit significant and meaningful variation in their institutional setup that are
not confounded with other concurrent changes. Such broader institutional changes, for
example brought about by democratization, are compound treatments that make it harder
to distinguish independent effects of specific institutional features. Third, measuring
and identifying the degree of cohesiveness of institutions is not trivial. While political
institutions may seem non-cohesive along certain dimensions such as religion, ethnicity
or identity, the extent to which the public actually perceives institutions as non-cohesive
depends on the extent to which society is polarized along these lines to begin with.
We argue that Nigeria provides a unique context that allows us to navigate these
challenges. First, we exploit Nigeria’s system of oil revenue sharing across the three
tiers of government. This has several advantages. On the empirical side, the revenue
sharing follows a fixed rule and the size of transfers is guided by the movements of world
oil prices. Further, the spatial concentration of oil wealth in the South of the country
1The existing literature has suggested – among others – that natural resources encourage inter-state con-
flict (Caselli et al., 2015), secession (Morelli and Rohner, 2015), improve the feasibility of rebellion (Berman
et al., 2017); other channels explored are due to the negative externalities of resource extraction (Sexton,
2018; Humphreys, 2005) and a lack of transparency around extraction activity (Christensen, 2017).
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allows us to isolate the effect that institutionalized rents have on political violence at
the local level. Hence, it is not confounded by any direct effects of extraction activity
on violence. Lastly, on the conceptual side, the revenue sharing matches a key tenet of
the theoretical model in Besley and Persson (2011): resource rents directly accrue to the
incumbent government, generating an asymmetry between incumbent and opposition
over access to rents. Second, Nigeria allows us to exploit variation in the extent of local
democratic practice within country and even within constitution over time due to existence
of rich and idiosyncratic variation in the extent to which local governments are appointed
or elected – holding constant the overall institutional setup. Lastly, we can leverage the
fact that Nigeria is a multi-ethnic society in which politics is significantly influenced by
the ethnic affiliation of population groups (Alesina et al., 2016; Hodler and Raschky, 2014).
We make three findings. First, consistent with the theoretical prediction in Besley
and Persson (2011), we document a significant and economically sizeable link between
resource rents and violence. These effects are driven by positive shocks to resource rents,
meaning higher revenues accruing to the local governments. The ensuing low-intensity
conflict is highly institutionalized involving government repression and militias using
targeted violence, though not broad, open rebellions involving riots or protests. The
finding suggests that revenue sharing – an institutional feature common to at least eleven
African countries – implies a novel type of resource-induced conflict: while violence may be
used to voice grievances or contest the allocation of resources, the patterns are inconsistent
with all-out civil war, which is not surprising given that civil war may compromise access
to rents in the first place (e.g. secession of non-oil producing areas is not a credible
contest goal). Revenue sharing may exacerbate latent low intensity distributional conflicts
in places far removed from physical resources, but we show that this conflict is associated
with places where governance is weak and institutions are non-cohesive.
Second, we find that having an elected local government systematically weakens the
link between rents and the incidence of political conflict. Rather than focusing on any
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individual election – which may cause violence directly (Long et al., 2017) – we contrast
consecutive periods over which local governments are elected (as opposed to appointed)
and study the systematic link between shocks to rents and violence across such peri-
ods. Our identification strategy allows us to tackle many plausible endogeneity concerns,
while providing sharp results that match key theoretical predictions in Besley and Pers-
son (2011). Further, while our main results are derived from the widely used ACLED
conflict data, we also turn to individual level micro data to corroborate our findings, doc-
umenting that fear of political violence, actual victimization, and even engagement in
conflict broadly follows the pattern suggested by the aggregate data. Given the still lim-
ited availability of data in the African context, we think this cross-check speaks to the
overall robustness of our results (Berman and Matanock, 2015).
Having an elected local government can affect political violence through a multitude
of channels. Our third set of findings highlights that – consistent with the theory –
the higher degree of cohesiveness of institutions that elections (as opposed to appointments)
produce, seem to drive the results. We construct a measure of non-cohesiveness capturing
the extent to which the ethnic make-up in an area is aligned with the ethnicity of the state
governor. We provide ample anecdotal evidence suggesting that when local governments
are appointed, these appointments are skewed towards the ethnicity of the state governor.
We validate this measure using individual level micro data and document that the link
between political violence and resource rents is strongly driven by this measure of non-
alignment – but only when local governments are appointed, not when they are elected.
This paper relates to three strands of literature. First, the literature studying the impor-
tant link between natural resources and civil conflict. Dube and Vargas (2013)’s seminal
paper studies civil conflict in Colombia, comparing oil versus coffee producing areas, and
finding evidence of both the opportunity cost and the rapacity effect. Sánchez De La Sierra
(2020) studies violence in coltan and gold mining regions in Congo. Berman et al. (2017)
study resource related conflict in Africa around fine spatial grid cells with mining activity,
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and Caselli et al. (2015) focus on interstate conflict over natural resources, while Limodio
(2019) exploits variation in silver prices to provide exogenous variation in extent of terror-
ism finance in Pakistan. Bazzi and Blattman (2014) provide an overview of the literature
exploiting commodity price shocks to study conflicts to find little evidence that increas-
ing commodity revenues incentivize state capture through violent means. Similarly, in
a cross-country study, Cotet and Tsui (2013) find little evidence that oil discoveries in-
crease the likelihood of violence, unlike Lei and Michaels (2014) who exploit giant oilfield
discoveries. Ciccone (2018) provides new cross-country evidence and asks important
questions about the construction of commodity price shock measures. Arellano-Yanguas
(2011) find that decentral revenue sharing in Peru is associated with increased political
conflicts, though Orihuela et al. (2019) suggests results are sensitive and require strong
contextual understanding. Our paper document a new type of resource conflict affecting
regions far away from the physical location of the resource, due to the institutionalized
sharing of resource revenues that we can explicitly measure. This observation highlights
a potential problem for empirical designs that study conflict over physical control of the
resource across space: revenue sharing is a spillover that violates the non-interference
assumption inherent in difference-in-difference estimations used in this literature.
We also relate to the literature on how institutions, especially democracy, shape devel-
opment outcomes and civil conflict. Brückner et al. (2012) document in a cross-country
panel study that positive oil price shocks are followed by moderate improvements in
democratic institutions (measured using the Polity-2 dataset), while Caselli and Tesei
(2016) suggest that resource windfalls make autocratic regimes even more autocratic,
while not affecting democratic countries. Martinez-Bravo et al. (2014) find that the in-
troduction of local village elections in China increased public goods expenditure financed
by villagers, caused a moderate decline in income inequality, and likely reduced corrup-
tion, while Martinez-Bravo et al. (2017) suggest that elite capture may persist through
democratic transitions. On the latter, Collier and Rohner (2008) suggest that democracy,
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due to the possibility of violence having an electoral cost, may be constraining the use of
force. On the other hand, the act of holding elections may encourage violence to affect
turnout (Collier and Vicente, 2014; Eifert et al., 2010; Long et al., 2017). Natural resource
rents may have further effects on political outcomes, not necessarily involving violence
in the form we document here. The concern with this work is the multitude of chan-
nels through which these effects could operate. It highlights the value of working with
subnational data exploiting time variation in a specific democratic institution, while holding
constant the overall institutional context, as we are able to do in this paper. Yet, it also
raises the concern that our subnational time-variation in transition to and from having
elected governments may be endogenous to commodity price cycles. We find no evidence
for this as local governments transition in and out of having elected local governments
quite unsystematically. Lastly, there is also a literature that exploits time variation in re-
source shocks on the quality of institutions holding the overall institutional framework
fixed. Carreri and Dube (2017) show how oil price shocks affect which type of political
candidate is elected in oil-producing municipalities in Colombia, while Brollo et al. (2013)
study how additional resource revenues accruing to a government induce corruption.
Lastly, we relate to the growing literature on ethnic politics in Africa in general, and
on power sharing as an important institution in particular. Politicians cultivate favor
among their constituents by appealing to ethnic and regional identities (Burgess et al.,
2015; Hodler and Raschky, 2014), which may result in significant ethnic between-group
inequality (Alesina et al., 2016). Francois et al. (2015) document a high degree of propor-
tionality between ministerial positions and ethnic group population shares, while Eifert
et al. (2010) find that ethnic identities become stronger before elections as political com-
petition intensifies. While Fearon and Laitin (2003) suggests that ethnic diversity is not
associated with a higher civil conflict incidence, Buhaug et al. (2008) show that the po-
litical exclusion of ethnic groups from political power poses a conflict risk. Cederman
et al. (2010) analyze the state as an institution captured by particular ethnic communities.
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Reynal-Querol (2002) emphasizes the importance of establishing consociational democ-
racies – proportional representation systems that produce coalition politics – to prevent
ethnic civil wars generated because of religious differences. While the creation of new
government districts along ethnic lines may reduce conflict, political violence is exac-
erbated in ethnically polarized new districts because of a nascent contest for political
power, as shown for Indonesia by Bazzi and Gudgeon (2016). Galindo-Silva (2015) shows
that improved representation of political groups in Colombia, reduces political violence.
However, even though the political representation of previously excluded groups may
improve power sharing at the local level, Fergusson et al. (2021) suggest that it may also
provoke retaliatory violence of the incumbent elites. Rohner et al. (2013a) document that
conflict reduces inter-ethnic trust, while the model in Rohner et al. (2013b) suggests that
measures fostering inter-ethnic trust and trade may be effective in avoiding a vicious cycle
of conflict (see also Mueller and Rohner, 2018 on power sharing in Northern Ireland).
Lastly, there is a small literature on Nigeria. Sala-i Martin and Subramanian (2013)
suggests that Nigeria’s institutions are negatively affected by the oil wealth undermining
growth; a more historic account of oil wealth and violence is given by Azam (2009),
while Collier and Vicente (2014) examines how voter intimidation is effective in reducing
voter turnout. Fenske and Zurimendi (2017) provides evidence on the long-run effects
of oil wealth increasing inequality; analyzing state capacity, Rasul and Rogger (2018)
investigates how management practices in the Nigerian public sector, such as autonomy
of the bureaucrat as well as incentives and monitoring, affect service delivery.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on
the institutional setup and discusses the data used. Section 3 examines whether political
rents induce conflict. In Section 4 we study whether having an elected local government
weakens this link. Section 5 provides evidence of the underlying mechanism. Section 6
concludes.
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2 Institutional Context and Data
We begin by describing the system of revenue sharing and local governance in Nigeria,
discuss the nature of conflict and local institutions. Along the way we introduce our data.
A more extensive discussion of the context is provided in Appendix B.
2.1 Fiscal federalism and natural resource revenues
Nigeria is organized as a Federation of States in the Nigerian Constitution of 1999.
The constitution stipulates a system of revenue sharing between the three tiers of govern-
ment (federal, state and local governments) according to a fixed formula. The collected
revenues are an oil production tax and value added tax (VAT). Oil revenues make up the
most significant share of government revenues and are important for public finances at
all levels of government: in 2013 oil revenues accounted for 75% of all revenues (World
Bank, 2013). Almost 90% of gross revenues available to local governments is due to dis-
bursements from the federation account (World Bank, 2013).2 The exogenously sourced
monthly allocations to local governments thus constitute the main source of political rents.
The revenue sharing system stipulates that, of the gross total of public revenues, 20.6%
are allocated to local governments, 26.7% are allocated to the states, and 52.7% are allo-
cated to the federal government (vertical formula).3 The share allocated to local govern-
ments is divided across each of the 774 local governments with each local government
having a specific weight ωi (with ∑i ωi = 1). These weights are essentially time-invariant
and fixed at a baseline year. Appendix Table A1 highlights that population and land-
mass are driving the cross-sectional variation in the index weights ωi, the resulting rich
variation in the index weights across the country is shown in panel A of Figure 2.
We digitize data on the monthly allocations and the index weights used in the alloca-
tion formula from the Federation Account Allocation Committee at the Nigerian Federal
2Local governments have limited ability to raise revenues with Ekpo and Englama (2008) showing that
they raise less than 5% of gross revenues primarily from property tax and market and trading licenses.
3The oil producing states receive 13% percent of oil revenues directly, called the Derivation Principle.
Our results are robust to excluding the oil producing states.
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Ministry of Finance. This gives us a monthly balanced panel of allocations across all 774
local government areas for the period June 1999 to July 2014. Variation in the monthly
allocations is mostly driven by the variation in oil prices as the amount of oil produced
is quite stable over our sample period.4 The actual allocations to local governments are
separated into statutory and extraordinary allocations. Both of these allocations respect
the same sharing rule as captured in the index weights ωi. The statutory allocations are
regular monthly disbursements calculated based on a benchmark oil price that tracks
the spot market price at a discount. Panel B in Figure 2 presents the statutory alloca-
tions against the oil price over time. Revenues that accrue due to the difference between
the spot market and benchmark price are accumulated in the Excess Crude Account.
Extraordinary allocations are disbursed irregularly and based on idiosyncratic political
decisions typically following periods when significant fiscal buffers were accumulated.5
In the empirical exercises, we focus on the statutory allocations, but use the extraordinary
allocations for robustness checks.
2.2 Political violence
Nigeria is in a state of low-intensity conflict. Small scale violent events cause numer-
ous casualties each year across all parts of the country. We propose that these conflicts
are — to a large extent — contests between political factions for the control over local
governments, driven by lucrative institutionalized resource rents. Incumbency of local
government councils conveys the perks of the allocations from the Federation Account
nurtured oil revenues. These conflicts fit in well within the Besley and Persson’s (2011)
contest logic with a few contextual adaptations. The contest logic in the Nigerian context
works through politicians investing in violence to secure access to or build up pressure
4Appendix Table A4 provides a formal decomposition of the variance in allocations highlighting that
the bulk of variation is explained by price (as opposed to quantity) variation.
5The benchmark price usually tracks the spot price at a discount resulting in accumulation of a fiscal
buffer. Appendix Table A2 presents a decomposition of within and between LGA variation for these dif-
ferent types of allocations (overall, statutory, and extraordinary allocations) indicating that the within-LGA
variation accounts for the most of the overall variation in allocations.
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on local governments. Incumbent politicians use state resources to either employ state
security or they may also additionally hire private thugs to intimidate civil society or
other politicians. The opposition politicians hire thugs and armed militias to contest ac-
cess to local governments. While in Besley and Persson (2011) either of the two groups
has full control over the government (incumbency), having access to local government
could also mean having partial power, i.e. a seat on the local government council (par-
tial incumbency). Hiring thugs is a common strategy among Nigerian politicians and
anecdotal evidence abounds. In contrast to the model, where the opposition politicians
collect taxes from its own citizens to finance a private army, in the Nigerian case, oppo-
sition politicians often rely on wealthy private donors, so-called political “godfathers”,
to finance militias. While in the model, the opposition group’s investments in violence
increase the likelihood of taking over power, in Nigeria investing in violence is also used
to extort funds from local governments. As a response to the difficult security situation,
governments invest public funds in security operations, so-called “security votes”.6 The
security votes are not only used to repress and fend off the opposition, they are often a
pretence for politicians to embezzle public funds. Security votes are a way of diverting
resources to various cronies and groups within the patronage network. This also includes
governments paying armed groups to stay non-violent (see for instance our detailed ac-
count of Boko Haram provided in Appendix B.4). While the model separates the states
of peace, repression and civil conflict, the situation in Nigeria is obviously less clear, with
fluid transitions between different states of violence and peace.
Civil conflict data over the entire sample period is drawn from the Armed Conflict
Location and Event Data Project (ACLED).7 The variation in conflict across Nigeria that
we use in our empirical analysis is displayed in Figure 1, indicating the number of violent
6For a detailed description about the nature security votes, see e.g. Egbo et al. (2012).
7The ACLED conflict events data is available at https://www.acleddata.com/. We use alternative con-
flict data to check the robustness of our results. Specifically, we use data from Uppsala Conflict Data Pro-
gram Georeferenced Event Dataset, available at http://ucdp.uu.se/, and the Global Terrorism Database
GTD, available at https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.
11
events for each of the 774 local government areas from 1999 to 2014.8 Raleigh and Dowd
(2015) provide a detailed description of variables and coding methodology. The ACLED
project provides details of geographic locations of conflict events, including latitude and
longitude, dates, and additional information on the actors involved. In particular, it
codes the actions of rebels, governments, and militias within unstable states, allowing
an analysis of the local level factors and the dynamics of civil and communal conflict.
We use this to construct a balanced LGA-level monthly panel from 1999 to 2014. The
numerous accounts of violent conflicts over local political power fuelled by the resource
rents allocated every month are a result of investments in violence both by the government
and opposition groups. We provide detailed anecdotal evidence about these low-intensity
conflicts between political factions in Appendix B.3. Importantly, we will see that this
violence is concentrated around positive shocks to political rents and does not seem to involve
mass-mobilization involving protests and riots, but rather involves violence orchestrated
by the incumbent resorting to the military and political militia groups. Grievances felt
by outsider groups, that see transfers made by those in power to their own group, seem
to be prevalent (see section 5). Violence is reported to be associated with the misconduct
of local government chairmen, mismanagement of local public finances such as failure
to pay salaries, the embezzlement of public funds, and failure to provide education and
health care. The acts of fraud are used by opposing political groups to mobilize and
provoke violent reactions and contest their share of the allocation. An overt manifestation
of the contest for rents and political control occurs around local government elections. We
report a significant increase in civil violence in the month leading up to local elections
and the month of the election itself, as depicted in Figure A1 in the appendix. Though our
results, as we will show in detail, are not driven by election related violence but rather
occur systematically within periods of the different regimes.
8For a detailed discussion of violence in Nigeria and the ACLED data set, see appendix B.3.
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2.3 Cohesiveness of local government institutions
What makes institutions cohesive? Besley and Persson (2011) describe cohesive insti-
tutions as more representative of the population, including minority protection through
a system of constitutional checks and balances. They use a measure of executive con-
straints as a crude proxy for cohesive institutions. We argue and provide evidence that
local government institutions appear more cohesive when local government councils are
elected as opposed to appointed by state governors. Elections allow for opposition parties
to compete legally and non-violently. They elevate the public profile of local politicians
and make local councils (at least partly) accountable to the public – as opposed to the
state governor when they are appointed. Since local government councillors are elected
in single seat districts by plurality rule, councillors represent the various wards in a local
government area. Elections are thus a way of enabling minority (ethnic) groups’ represen-
tation representing minority protection as conceptualized in Besley and Persson (2011).9
Elected or appointed local government councils The 1999 constitution of Nigeria re-
quires that local government councils are elected by the people. It also stipulates that
state governments organize and finance the local government elections. This gives the
state governments some leeway in how they legislate for and conduct local government
elections. The first local council elections during the transition from military to democratic
rule were held in November/December 1998 in all local government areas. The first term
of the original local councils ended in May 2002. At that time, confusion emerged as the
national voter register used in the 1999 general election had not yet been updated for
new elections.10 In June 2002, state governors appointed committees to (temporarily) run
the local governments, called “transition committees”. Elections of local councillors have
9Local government councils consist of a number of councillors and a chairman. The single seat districts
are the wards of each local government area. In these single-seat electoral districts where a minority has a
majority in that district (minority-majority district), it is possible for the minority to win a councillor seat
and be represented in the local government council.
10A supreme court ruling in 2002 held that local government elections should not to be held until the
voter register was updated (reported e.g. in the newspaper This Day, May 8 2002).
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been controversial ever since.11 In the subsequent years, state governors started to exploit
their idiosyncratic political power to postpone or cancel local elections altogether. As a
consequence, many local government councils ceased to be elected bodies, and became
appointed bodies. This results in significant de-facto variation in local political institu-
tions across Nigeria that we exploit in this paper.
Measurement We draw data on the conduct of local government council elections or
appointment of so-called “transition” or “caretaker” committees from a media content
analysis using Nigerian newspapers, presented in more detail in Kyburz (2018). Since
official information on local councils is not available we rely on local newspapers from
which we extract information on local elections. In particular, we extract information
for each of the 774 local government areas on the dates when local elections were held,
the period of tenure of elected councils, and the periods in which appointed committees
were in power. By coding a dummy variable that captures whether a local council is
elected (Elected = 1) or appointed as caretaker committee by the state governor (Elected
= 0), we exploit the de facto variation in the ‘state of democracy’ at the local level. We
do not analyze any individual election, but rather focus on consecutive periods in which
local governments are elected (as opposed to appointed). Panel C of Figure 2 displays the
geographic variation in the overall time that areas have an elected local government coun-
cil between 1999 to 2014, while Panel D presents the overall share of local governments
that are elected at a specific point in time. An in-depth discussion of local government
responsibilities and council elections is provided in Appendix B.5.12
The cohesiveness of local government institutions depends, inter alia, on whether local
councils are elected by the people or appointed by the state governor. We presume and
provide ample anecdotal and empirical evidence that elected local government councils
11See Kyburz (2018) for a more detailed description of the controversy surrounding local government
council elections and the appointment of caretaker committees.
12This is a rather coarse distinction between elected and appointed local governments. There naturally
is variety in the quality and the conduct of local elections with some being more competitive, free and
fair than others. Our coding represents a simplification of democratic realities on the ground but, as we
demonstrate does capture meaningful variation among many shades of electoral local democracy.
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involve more constituencies in the governing process. Elections are thus protecting mi-
norities and put more constraints on the executive as they improve accountability and
balance power. This is in contrast to appointments of local councillors by state governors
that render the local government institutions less cohesive by eliminating any public ac-
countability and deteriorate representation. They appear to maximize control over local
governments and the distributions of rents to cronies. Appointed councillors can make
transfers to their own groups without fearing repercussions. Anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that the rents are often used for patronage, which may further grievances among
marginalized groups. These grievances are likely to be pronounced in cases where local
governments do not have electoral incentives to share the rents with the local population
through the provision of common public goods (Besley and Persson, 2011). Because of
the high volatility in oil prices, the flow of allocations into local accounts is both hard to
predict and opens the floodgates to misappropriate public funds.
We show that the varying cohesiveness of institutions is borne out in peoples’ percep-
tions of local governments as we demonstrate in section 5 using Afrobarometer microdata.
Similarly, appointments generally appear to be made along ethnic lines thus revealing the
non-cohesiveness of institutions.13 Periods of appointed governments presumably exac-
erbate the prevalence of ethnic politics as state governors are likely to appoint co-ethnic
cronies (Burgess et al., 2015; Hodler and Raschky, 2014). Grievances amid the population
and cleavages between ethnic groups may intensify when politicians use ethnic identities
to make financial transfers to their own group as modeled by Besley and Persson (2011).
The non-cohesiveness of the local institutions leads to investments in violence by the
opposition group, that tries to improve the chances of controlling the local government.
In the following section 3, we turn to showing that institutionalized resource rents in-
duce political conflict, before presenting evidence that elected local governments weaken
the link between rents and violence in section 4.
13The non-cohesiveness resulting in people feeling treated less fairly in periods when their own ethnicity
is not aligned with the state governor’s (see Table A18).
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3 Do Resource Rents Induce Conflict?
We first present evidence that institutionalized resource rents are causing political
violence. To allow for the later contrast, we restrict the estimating sample to only those
time periods in which local councils are appointed.
3.1 Empirical strategy
Our estimation strategy consists of both an ordinary least squares and an instrumental
variables estimation approach. Our baseline specification is
yjst = αj + γ× Allocjst + δst + ε jst (1)
where the dependent variable yjst indicates the incidence of conflict in local government
area j, state s, and month t. Allocjst are the monthly disbursements to a local government
area. Throughout, we control for LGA-specific fixed effects, αj, and state-by-time fixed
effects, δst. While we obtain very similar results using less demanding specifications, the
inclusion of state-by-time fixed effects is appealing for two reasons: first, states participate
in the revenue sharing and thus, controlling for state by time fixed effects controls for
those flows; second, they remove any state-specific non-linear conflict trends.
We expect our coefficient of interest γ to be positive, γ > 0, indicating that positive
shocks to rents increase the incidence of repression and political violence. In the context
of Besley and Persson (2011) this is because more rent accruing to the incumbent, all else
equal, increases the value of holding political power for the incumbent (and of gaining
it for the opposition) as this enables transfers to the own group if institutions are not
cohesive. As a result, both the incumbent and the opposition invest in violence.
In addition to the OLS estimation, we use an instrumental variable approach to counter
any endogeneity or measurement concerns in the monthly disbursements to local govern-
ments. Equation 2 represents the first-stage specification. The central input to the revenue
sharing formula is the variable ωj, which captures a local authority’s share in the overall
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revenue allocation. The second ingredient is a measure of the Oil pricet which drives the
bulk of the variation in overall revenues.
Allocjst = αj + π ×ωj ×Oil pricet + δst + x
′
jstβ + ε jst (2)
The second stage taking the instrumented allocations ’Allocjst as regressors becomes:
yjst = αj + γ×’Allocjst + δst + x′jstβ + ε jst (3)
As we will see, the revenue sharing formula is followed very closely. As a result, in order
to conserve space, we do not show the IV estimates everywhere in the results.14 The
identifying assumption for γ in specification 3, representing the causal effect of natural
resource rents on conflict, is that there is no other indirect way by which the interaction
between ωj×Oil pricet affects conflict other than through the allocations. This would be a
concern if there were other policies linked to the specific ωj used for the revenue sharing.
It would also be a concern if oil price shocks had a differential effect on e.g. economic
activity in locations that is not captured through the interaction with the allocation weight.
3.2 Results
The main results, focusing on the periods in which local governments are appointed, are
presented in Table 1 for both the OLS and IV exercises. The results suggest a significant
and considerable relationship between civil conflict measures, and inflows of resource
revenues during periods when local governments are appointed. The effects are sizeable:
the point estimate in column (1) suggests that a one standard deviation increase in allo-
cations is associated with a more than doubling of the conflict event incidence relative to
the average incidence. This implies that revenue sharing and resource rents are a major
14All results are robust to either showing the IV or the OLS. These results are available upon request.
The similarity in the OLS and IV estimates is owing to the fact that, as Appendix Table A4 reveals, the
instrument and the allocation measure are tightly moving together with the R2 measure of 97% in the
specification with LGA and time fixed effects.
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source of political conflict and violence. Columns (2) – (4) study the three types of events
covered in ACLED: “battles” – involving any interaction between organized combatants,
“violence against civilians”, and “protests/riots”. We see that rents are most strongly
associated with an increasing incidence of battles and violence against civilians, while we
observe a null result for protests and riots. We discuss this further below.
Columns (4) – (8) cover the groups involved in conflict, distinguishing between the
military, political militias, communal militias, and rebels. The results indicate that the
effects are mostly driven by conflict events involving the military, political and communal
militias, and not by rebel violence. The latter is a telling null result: rebel groups, as per
ACLED’s definition are “political organizations whose goal is to counter an established
national governing regime by violent acts [...] with a stated political agenda for national
power (either through regime replacement or separatism)”. Yet, as we argued earlier, se-
cession is not a viable contest goal as as secession would cut most parts of Nigeria off from
further transfers. Therefore, a null result here is not surprising. Lastly, in columns (9) –
(10) we further decompose column (6), to study between which actors conflict unfolds:
most events involve political militias either fighting the military or targeting civilians.
A comparison of the OLS and the IV results (Panel A and B) reveal a limited need
for instrumenting in the first place since the gross statutory allocations are almost fully
explained by the interaction term. The weak-IV test statistic is far from any levels that
would merit concern regarding the weakness of the instrument.15 Since the allocation
rule is being tightly followed and the OLS and IV results are very similar throughout,
for brevity, we do not report the IV estimates in all tables the remainder of this paper to
preserve space. They are available upon request.16 We also note no differential effects in
15This is not surprising as Appendix Table A4 suggests that the allocation rule is very closely followed
with a specification without time and location fixed effects reaching an R2 of 86%.
16The results are robust to a battery of checks: we obtain similar results when studying quarterly or
annual resolution of the data; when considering transformations of the conflict measures; alternative functional
forms; when flexibly controlling for the revenue sharing formula weights; when studying different conflict
data altogether; or when removing Boko-Haram conflict events. As we perform the same battery of checks
in the next section contrasting the elected vis-à-vis appointed time periods the relevant tables for these
exercises are presented in Appendix Tables A12 - A17.
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oil producing areas suggesting our results are not capturing contest over the resource.17
3.3 Discussion
The analysis suggests that resource revenue sharing may itself be associated with insta-
bility and violence in areas far removed from the actual location of oil production. We be-
lieve that we are the first to document this institutionalized spillover effect. This has broader
implications since revenue sharing is quite common across countries, possibly implying a
violation of the non-interference assumption inherent to difference-in-difference designs
comparing natural resource producing areas to non-producing areas. Further, the conflict
that we document is institutionalized – not involving mass riots or protests – which we
would a-priori expect if resources are misappropriated. As we will see, the conflict is
mainly driven by positive shocks to resource revenues, while negative shocks, if anything,
are associated with slightly less conflict. The null result on protests and riots suggests
that citizens may be poorly informed about revenue allocations or have a systematically
different attitude to the misallocation of natural resource revenues as opposed to taxes
(see e.g. Gadenne, 2017; Martı́nez, 2020). We next show that the link between violence
and rents appears distinctly different when local governments are elected.
4 Do Elected Local Governments Promote Peace?
In this section we show that local democratic institutions can reduce the resource rent
induced civil conflict demonstrated in the previous section.
4.1 Empirical specification
We follow the previous section to augment our specification to incorporate the data
pertaining to periods in which local governments are elected. We estimate
yjst = αje + νAllocjst × Electedjst + γAllocjst + δst + ε jst (4)
17See Appendix Table A3: there is only limited evidence of a slightly weaker relationship between
resource rents and conflict in areas that are (likely) produce oil.
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where the dependent variable yjst indicates the incidence of conflict in local government
area j, state s, and month t. Allocjst are the monthly disbursements to a local govern-
ment area. Having an elected local government enters through the interaction term
Allocjst × Electedjst. Our location fixed effects αje are specific to whether a local authority
area has an elected or appointed local council. This implies that we allow there to be dis-
tinct conflict level differences of having an elected local government for each LGA. While
less demanding specifications yield similar results, this implies that we fully abstain – for
now – from studying any level effects that having an elected local government may entail
and fully focus on the role of rents. Relative to the previous section, we are are particu-
larly interested in the estimates of the coefficient ν, expecting it to be negative, ν < 0. This
would indicate that areas and periods in which the local government is elected sees sig-
nificantly weaker link between resource rents and conflict. As with the previous section,
we also estimate the corresponding instrumental variable specification.
4.2 Results
The results from this analysis are presented in Table 2. Panel A presents the OLS
results. We find that upon adding the interaction of having an elected local government
suggest that more cohesive institutions significantly weaken the relationship between re-
source rents and conflict that was documented in the previous section. Throughout, the
estimated effect of the interaction term between the natural resource rents and the election
status indicator, ν, is negative and statistically significant, at the 5% or 1% level in most
estimations. As we will see further below, the linear regressions are likely to underestimate
the effect of elected councils: the link is mostly weakened by positive shocks to resource
rents, but not negative ones. In Panel B we present the same set of regressions applying
our instrumental variable approach. If at all, results are even stronger and effect sizes
larger. A comparison of the OLS and IV results (Panel A and B) reveal a limited need
for instrumenting in the first place since the gross statutory allocations are almost fully
explained by the interaction term ωj ×Oil pricet. The weak-IV test statistic is far from
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levels that would merit concern regarding the weakness of our instruments.
We perform F-tests on the joint significance, testing whether ν̂ + γ̂ = 0. Throughout
most outcome measures we find a notably weaker and mostly insignificant relationship
between resource rents and conflict in places with elected governments. We will posit the
underlying mechanism in the next section but first tackle a few plausible concerns that
one may have with the above exercise.
4.3 Addressing plausible concerns
There are several plausible concerns that we address in turn.
Elections A specific worry could be that elections change the nature of violent contest,
concentrating violence near individual elections. While our results do not focus on any
one specific election but study transitions between consecutive political regimes (peri-
ods of elected vis-à-vis appointed local governments), we can tackle this valid concern
by restricting the estimating sample to exclude windows around individual elections.18
If anything the results, presented in Appendix Table A5, suggest that our results on
how elections change the relationship between resource rents and conflict become even
sharper.
Another concern may pertain to the endogeneity of elections to local conditions or
potentially, to the underlying resource rents. We tackle this in three ways. In Appendix
Table A6 we document that most of the variation in election status is explained by our
state by time fixed effects, suggesting that this is a decision that is taken at the state level.
Hence, holding elections only in a select set of LGAs within a state – but not others –
seems politically infeasible. Thus, the decision by the state governor to hold or not hold
elections is probably exogenous to the conditions of any specific LGA. Second, we do not
estimate the direct level effect of having an elected local government, but focus on the
interaction term. We argue that this interaction term is exogenous to the conditions in
18In an event study in Appendix Figure A1, we show that there is an increase in violence in a tight time
window around individual elections.
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any specific location for two reasons: first, as already proposed, the decision to hold an
election is taken at the state level with limited scope to take the specific conditions in any
LGA into account and second, since oil price movements are erratic and state electoral
commissions need at least three to six months preparation time, it seems implausible that
e.g. conflicts are fought in anticipation of higher resource rents and elections. Lastly, we
can directly test whether the residual variation in having an elected local government that
remains after controlling for state by time fixed effects meaningfully correlates with an
LGA’s time-varying or time-invariant characteristics. Neither allocations in the last 3, 6,
or 12 months, nor conflict in the last 3, 6, or 12 months, nor an areas climatic conditions,
its ethnic make-up or its allocation weights (see Appendix Table A7 and A8) correlate
with the residual variation left after controlling for state by time fixed effects. These three
arguments leave us confident in interpreting the interaction term as a causal effect.
Potential withholding or deductions There may be concerns that LGA allocations may
be withheld in period of instability or there may be deductions. Legally there is no basis
for the federal or state government to withhold allocations as the sharing of revenues is
set in the country’s 1999 constitution. In Appendix B.2 we provide an extensive account of
periods in which transfers may have nevertheless been temporarily affected by deductions
or withholding. As we show in Appendix Table A9 our results are robust to generously
dropping data that may have been affected by alleged withholding or deductions.
Direct favoritism Another concern may be governors’ direct favoritism towards individ-
ual LGAs. We can directly control for this favoritism channel by including state governor-
specific and election-status specific LGA fixed effects – these results are presented in
Appendix Table A10. Since every state has, on average, 3.4 distinct state governors over
our sample period and many see multiple transitions between elected vis-à-vis appointed
status, this amounts to controlling for, on average, five distinct sets of LGA fixed effects.
Despite this specification being extremely demanding – and likely introducing a lot of
irrelevant control variables, inflating standard errors and resulting in a loss of statistical
22
power – we still observe very similar patterns.
Non-linear effects As we suggested before, the estimated effects on the interaction term
we document in Table 2 are underestimating the true effect, due to non-linearities in the
relationship between resource rents and conflict. We estimate a non-parametric water-
color regression per Hsiang (2013), presented in Figure 3.19 The left panel shows that,
with an appointed local government, there is an association with negative shocks to re-
source rents being associated with less conflict, while positive shocks to resource rents
trigger conflict. The right panel constructs the figure using the subset of data when local
councils are elected: while negative shocks continue to be weakly associated with less
conflict, positive revenue shocks are not associated with conflict. This result suggests that
with elected local governments, the tensions over distributional disputes arising with pos-
itive revenue shocks are resolved in a non-violent manner. Furthermore, as evidenced by
the green solid OLS regression line, the effects we document by estimating a linear regres-
sion underestimate the effect of having elected local governments, which mostly operates
through its moderating impact during positive resource shocks.
Dropping each state in turn In Appendix Figure A3 we present the results that are
obtained when dropping data from each state in turn visualized as a box-plot for any
violence indicator. Throughout there is no evidence that the results – either the OLS or
the IV – are particularly reliant on any one individual state.
Randomisation inference We also use two forms of randomization inference as an alter-
native method for inference. Figure A4 presents the results of a permutation test, whereby
the LGA specific sequences of elected vs. appointed regimes have been shuffled randomly
within each LGA. The kernel density plots out the distribution of point estimates of the
interaction effect between the (shuffled) election dummy and the gross statutory alloca-
tions ν̂ in our main estimating specification. The red solid line corresponds to the point
19Results from a more conventional estimation method are presented in Appendix Figure A2. The
method is described in more detail in Hsiang (2013).
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estimate obtained using the true (non-shuffled) election status variable for the interaction
term – for reference the dashed blue line provides the point estimate of the main level
effect . It is clear that the interaction for the true election status variable lies on a far tail
relative to the distribution of point estimates for the shuffled variable.
Figure A5 presents results from shuffling the election status variable at the state level
as opposed to the LGA level. This requires us to assign binary values in case there is
variation within state, with not all LGAs within the state holding the same status. This
affects 1,328 state by time observations out of the total 7,104 observations. We assign
election status to 1 if more than 50% of the LGAs in a state have an elected LGA at a
point in time, assigning a value of zero otherwise. Despite this coarser measurement
introducing noise, we are able to reject the null of no effect at around the 5% level.
Other robustness checks Our results are also robust to a battery of further checks. Ap-
pendix Table A12 shows that we obtain very similar results focusing only on the extraordi-
nary allocations that can be triggered and shared according to the formula in case notable
reserves accumulate. We further check our results using alternative conflict data in Ap-
pendix Table A13, transformations in the dependent variable in Appendix Table A14, for
different temporal resolutions in Appendix Table A15, and alternative functional forms
in Appendix Table A16. Further, controlling flexibly for index weights doesn’t affect the
results, shown in Table A17. Throughout the results are very similar. Next, we validate
these results using micro-data.
4.4 Validating results using individual level micro data
To corroborate our findings, we use the Afrobarometer surveys to evaluate whether
individuals’ perceptions of violence map into our findings derived from aggregate data.
Specifically, we focus on people’s fear of becoming a victim of political violence, whether
individuals have been victimized, and if people engage in political violence themselves.
We construct a pseudo-panel of surveyed individuals at the LGA level. This has to be
taken with a grain of salt, as the sampling is not representative at the LGA level and
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unfortunately, not every question is asked in each round. Nevertheless, we can use this
to study whether patterns are broadly consistent with the analysis from the conflict data.
To construct a measure of the revenue shock, we compute the total rents accruing to
a local government area in the last 6, 12, and 18 months prior to the survey. The election
status is coded based on the survey month. We then estimate the following specification
yijst = αj + δt + ν× Allocjt × Electedjt + γAllocjt + β× Xijt + εijt (5)
where now in addition the subindex i indicates an individual response and the allocation
variables are constructed as described above. The results are presented in Table 3. A
consistent image emerges: locally accruing resource rents increase individual fear of being
a victim of political violence (columns 1 and 2), increase the actual victimization (columns
3 and 4) and importantly, indicate that they increase the propensity of individuals to
engage in violent acts (columns 5 and 6). Once an LGA has an elected government, these
associations are significantly weaker.
5 Do Differences in Cohesiveness Explain these Effects?
We next study whether local government elections – by improving the cohesiveness of
local governments – weaken the link between resource rents and conflict.
5.1 Anecdotal evidence
Ethnicity plays an important role in Nigerian politics. We exploit the ethnic affiliation
of state governors, who are known to make local government appointments along ethnic
lines. There is ample anecdotal evidence to support this. For example, in Adamawa
State, Governor Murtala Nyako, who was in office between 2007 and 2014, belongs to
the Hausa-Fulani ethnicity that makes up 31% of the state population. In 2011, Governor
Nyako was accused of favoring his Fulani co-ethnics when appointing local governments:
He [Nyako] was accused of concentrating a large percentage of his appoint-
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ments among his fellow Fulani ethnic stock especially to his kiths and kin of
Mayo Belwa where he hails from. (Leadership, 23 February 2011)
To construct a measure of cohesion, we build a detailed map of the population shares
of different ethnic groups in LGAs across Nigeria, exploiting the fact that the DHS survey
rounds record the ethnicity of the respondents. We combine the data pertaining to all
individual DHS surveys. The dominant ethnic group across LGAs based on population
shares is presented in Appendix Figure A6.20
5.2 Measuring non-cohesiveness
In addition to the data on ethnic population shares we also collected data on the eth-
nicity of the state governor. Under the assumption that local governments are appointed
along ethnic lines, with the state governor favoring members of their own ethnic group,
these appointments are likely to impact the (perceived) cohesiveness of local governments
in a heterogeneous way. In particular, in areas in which the local population is of the same
ethnic group as the state governor, institutions seem relatively more cohesive compared
to areas where the governor’s co-ethnic population share is small. Our measure of non-
cohesiveness captures the share of the local population that is of a different ethnic group
to the state governor. Formally, denote Ekt the ethnic group of the governor in state k at
time t. We infer the population share of the politically excluded i.e. non-aligned ethnic
group in LGA j at time t, as
Non-aligned ethnic groupjt = ∑
i 6=Ekt
pit (6)
where pit are the ethnic group population shares. Since governors have limited terms in
office, the governor’s ethnicity is also changing over time, which produces a limited de-
gree of time-variation in our measure of non-aligned ethnic groups. We can think of this
20Appendix Figure A7 displays the population shares of the ethnic groups mentioned above across
Adamawa and Akwa Ibom State to illustrate the anecdotes. We use this to construct a measure of exclusion
from political power based on the ethnicity of the state governor, which we describe next.
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measure as the inverse of the cohesiveness parameter in Besley and Persson (2011), imply-
ing that areas and time periods with larger excluded populations (Non-aligned ethnic groupjt
→ 1), are vulnerable to intergroup violence.
To assess whether our measure of exclusion is picking up a meaningful signal, we
again turn to the Afrobarometer surveys. For some survey rounds, the data provides the
ethnic affiliation of respondents, allowing us to measure at the individual level whether
individuals from a different ethnic group to that of the state governor feel that their own
ethnic group is treated unfairly. Appendix Table A18 highlights that this appears to be the
case, suggesting that our measure of ethnic non-alignment is picking up some grievances.
This evidence, together with the anecdotal accounts, suggests that ethnic politics is likely
to matter and the exclusion measure should carry some signal relevant to the theory.
5.3 Empirical specification
We perform two related empirical tests with slightly less demanding empirical specifi-
cations. First, rather than ignoring any potential level effect of having an elected local gov-
ernment on conflict, we study whether the data suggests such a level effect and whether
this is driven by areas in which a large share of the population is of a different ethnic
group to the state governor. We estimate
yjst = αj + ηElectedjst ×Non-aligned ethnic groupjt (7)
+ ν× Electedjst + ξ ×Non-aligned ethnic groupjt + δt + ε jst
As suggested, this amounts to a test of Corollary 4 in Besley and Persson (2011), which
proposes there to be a strictly lower likelihood of conflict in places with more cohesive
institutions. As such, we would expect that any effect of having an elected local gov-
ernment on conflict levels should be driven by areas manifesting non-cohesiveness, i.e.
those that stand out with high values in Non-aligned ethnic groupjt. Hence, in the above
specification, we expect the estimate on the interaction η to be negative, η < 0.
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The second exercise builds on the previous analysis and directly tests whether the link
between resource rents and conflict is driven by places that have non-cohesive institutions.
For ease of interpretation of the results, we use a dummified measure of the ethnic ex-
clusion to indicate above- or below median Non-aligned ethnic groupjt. This allows us to
contrast the extent to which the relationship between resource rents and conflict is sys-
tematically more pronounced in places and times with an appointed local governments
with a sizable excluded population share compared to elected local governments with a
sizable population share that is of a different ethnic group then the state governor.
Relative to the main estimation specifications 1 and 4, we add a full set of interaction
terms to estimate the differential impact that resource rents have depending on whether
an area has an appointed or elected local government and depending on the extent to
which there is a notable population share in a district that has an ethnic group different
from that of the state governor. Further, due to lack of statistical power, we need to
make the time fixed effects less demanding – rather than including state-by-time fixed
effects, we now include only simple time fixed effects. Here, we expect that resource
rent induced conflict is most pronounced in areas with a significant share of the local
population excluded from political power, when local governments are appointed. On
the other hand, when local governments are elected, these areas should be mostly driving
the weakening of the relationship between rents and conflict.
5.4 Results
We present these results in turn. Table 4 presents results from the first analysis, esti-
mating whether having an elected local government has an effect on levels of conflict. Panel
A presents the estimation of just the plain difference-in-difference estimation. Through-
out the majority of estimated coefficients indicate that having an elected local government
is associated with less conflict. The results indicate that conflict incidence is around 50%
lower during time-periods when local governments are elected as opposed to appointed.
Panel B studies a heterogeneous effect version, using the measure of ethnic exclusion.
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As expected, the reduction in conflict is mostly driven by places that would see a no-
table share of the local population excluded from political power, when appointments
are informed by the ethnicity of the state governor. This suggests that more cohesive
institutions, which elections seem to generate, are associated with notably less conflict.
We next turn to study how resource rents and our implicit measure of the degree of
cohesion interact. These results are presented in Table 5.21 In Panel A, we document
that indeed during periods when local governments are appointed, the impact of re-
source rents on violence is notably stronger in places with a significant sized population
excluded from political power. Very systematically we find that exogenous variation in
resource rents are more strongly associated with increased violence in places with a no-
tably higher share of people likely excluded. In Panel B, we study how this relationship
changes when including periods when local governments are elected, adding the relevant
interaction terms. We estimate how the pass through of resource rent shocks to conflict
differs between places and periods that have an appointed vis-à-vis elected local govern-
ment and in which a notable share of residents is of a different ethnic group vis-à-vis the
state governor. We find that the link between resource rents and conflict notably more
pronounced in places and periods with an appointed local government and a notable
population share that is likely excluded by virtue of having a different ethnic group vis-
a-vis the state governor. This result is compelling as it illustrates the important role local
elections may play in forming cohesive governments at the local level. It suggests that
elected local governments are able to resolve contests in a peaceful manner.
We thus find ample evidence that the transition towards having elected local gov-
ernments is systematically associated with changing conflict dynamics. The differential
degrees of cohesion that the two distinct institutional setups (appointed versus elected)
generate are at the heart of understanding political violence. While the level effect may
be subject to some debate regarding potential excludability, we think we have a convinc-
21Thanks to an anonymous referee for the suggestion to present this results using binary indicators.
Results with the continuous measure are provided for reference in Appendix Table A22.
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ing case about the exogeneity of the interaction terms we study. Lastly, we turn again to
micro-survey data to substantiate these conclusions.
5.5 Are elected local councils perceived to handle resources differently?
The results so far suggest that political violence ceases to be associated with resource
rents during periods when local governments are elected. The evidence suggested that
this is substantively driven by the systematic exclusion of ethnic groups from political
power when local governments are appointed. This suggests that elected (as opposed to
appointed) local governments are perceived to be managing resources differentially. We
investigate whether having elected local governments improves perceptions of the quality
of local governance. This directly maps into the previous analysis: does the perception
of quality, corruption and distrust in government evolve in a fashion correlated with
inflow of rents? As before we use consecutive rounds of the Afrobarometer survey data
measuring how the relationship between the approval of local governments, the extent of
trust and the perception of corruption change as a function of rents.
The results are presented in Table 6. Columns (1) and (2) suggest that resource rents
are associated with negative perceptions of local governments during periods when these
are appointed. Having elected local governments significantly weakens this link. In
columns (3) and (4) we perform a similar exercise studying corruption perceptions: re-
source rents are associated with increased perceived corruption, yet, only when local
governments are appointed. Lastly, in columns (5) and (6) we show that when govern-
ments are appointed, resource rents are associated with lower levels of trust. Again this
relationship is significantly weaker when local governments are elected.
These results, together with the results presented in Table 5, suggest that elected local
governments are capable of resolving the contest for resource rents in an institutional form
within the local government, and not invoking violence. The change in the relationship
between resource rents and improved approval and trust of people in the local govern-
ment suggests that electoral incentives may improve the quality of resource management
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and sharing. We highlight with a type of placebo exercise that these results are specific
to the perception of the quality of local governments and are not confounded by concur-
rent changes in the perceptions of quality of government at other levels of government.
Leveraging the fact that similar measures of the perceptions of the quality governance are
collected for the Federal Parliament and State level institutions, we show in Appendix Ta-
ble A19 and A20 that there are no similar patterns between resource rents, election status
of local governments and perceptions of federal or state level institutions.
6 Conclusion
Whether scarce resources are allocated in a concordant and peaceful manner or in-
voke coercion and violence is an important question that guides a lot of political econ-
omy research. This study contributes to our understanding of how a particular type of
democratic institution – elected local governments – can shape and moderate the inter-
actions between groups in a peaceful fashion. This question is particularly relevant to
countries with significant resource wealth, such as Nigeria, as democratic oversight and
a tight institutional framework are proposed to be critical for ensuring that countries are
not cursed by their resource wealth. While theory has suggested the importance of insti-
tutions, empirical studies of these questions has struggled to provide sound evidence.
Exploiting within-country variation in democratic institutions at the local level in
Nigeria, we show that having an elected local government is key to explaining why re-
source rents are associated to a much lesser extent with conflict in some places compared
to others. In doing so, we are able to exploit institutional features that significantly relax
identification concerns, while at the same time matching key tenets of theoretical models.
We exploit the sharing of natural resource revenues across tiers of government according
to a fixed formula, which ensures that we can rule out any direct effects that the extraction
activity can have on political violence. Rather, we can focus exclusively on the impact of
these rents and document that, when local governments are appointed, rents are associ-
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ated with instability and political violence. We show, consistent with the theory, that the
underlying mechanism is working through the different degrees of cohesion that the two
means of selection of local governments provide. The more disconnected local govern-
ments are from their populations – proxied by the ethnic make-up – the more likely it is
that a positive shock to resource rents is associated with political violence. We confirm
these findings both in aggregate as well as using individual level micro survey data.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Conflict intensity across Nigeria









Notes: The map shows the distribution of conflict events across local government areas in the period 1999 to 2014. Sources: conflict
data is from ACLED and administrative boundaries are from Global Administrative Areas (GADM; https://gadm.org/).
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Figure 2: Spatial and temporal variation in revenue sharing and the election status across in Nigeria from 1999-2014
Spatial and temporal variation in revenue sharing
Panel A: Formula weights Panel B : Allocations










Spatial and temporal variation in election status
Panel C: Spatial variation in election status Panel B: Temporal variation










Notes: Figure presents the spatial and temporal variation exploited in the paper. The top panels focus on the revenue sharing
with Panel A presenting the share of revenues that accrue to each local government area based on the horizontal revenue sharing
formula, while Panel B presents the monthly variation in overall revenue allocations made to local governments in aggregate (right
scale) along with the monthly prices of Brent Crude oil (left scale). The bottom panel focuses on the election status of LGAs over
time with Panel C presenting the variation across space and Panel D presenting the variation across all LGAs over time.
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Figure 3: Positive and Negative Resource Shocks Under Elected and Appointed Regime
(a): Appointed Local Council (b): Elected Local Council
Notes: The figure showcases the non-linear impact of positive- versus negative revenue shocks on conflict. The figure presents results from bootstrapped lowess regressions on the
residuals of the dependent variable, after having demeaned the data by LGA and state-by-time fixed effects. The method first computes lowess regressions from 1000 bootstrapped
samples of the demeaned data. It then calculates density estimates of the predictions from the lowess regressions for several hundred cuts along the y-axis and distributes a specified
color proportional to that density estimate. The resulting figure displays the uncertainty in the regressions visually. The median value of the bootstrapped lowess predictions is indicated
as a solid white line, while OLS regressions are indicated as a green line. Figure (a) presents the results for periods with appointed local councils, while Figure (b) displays the results
for periods with elected local councils.
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Table 1: The effect of resource rents on political violence when local councils are appointed
Type of Event Groups involved Between Pol. Militias &...
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Overall Battle Civilian Violence Protest Military Pol. Militia Comm. Militia Rebels Military Civilians
Panel A: OLS
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.237*** 0.116** 0.153*** 0.017 0.118** 0.199*** 0.065** -0.010 0.099** 0.136**
(0.077) (0.048) (0.051) (0.035) (0.046) (0.062) (0.027) (0.007) (0.042) (0.055)
Observations 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662
Number of LGCs 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768
Mean of DV .0292 .0112 .0152 .00471 .0108 .0191 .00495 .00105 .00767 .0127
Panel B: IV
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.341*** 0.126** 0.199*** 0.054 0.153*** 0.252*** 0.075** -0.005 0.109** 0.160**
(0.107) (0.057) (0.059) (0.040) (0.058) (0.086) (0.029) (0.011) (0.049) (0.068)
Kleibergen-Paap weak IV 361.9 361.9 361.9 361.9 361.9 361.9 361.9 361.9 361.9 361.9
Observations 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662
Number of LGCs 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768
Mean of DV .0292 .0112 .0152 .00471 .0108 .0191 .00495 .00105 .00767 .0127
Notes: Table presents regression results capturing the impact of revenue shocks on conflict incidence focusing on the subsample in which LGAs are appointed. All dependent variables
are binary indicators capturing whether an event occurred in an LGA. All regressions control for state by time fixed effects and local government area (LGA) fixed effects. The dependent
variable includes (1) any violent conflict event defined as the use of force by a group with a political purpose. Type of events include (2) battles defined as violent interactions between two
politically organized armed groups; (3) violence involving civilians are violent acts by an organized political group against unarmed non-combatants; (4) protests are demonstrations
and spontaneous acts of violence by disorganised groups. Columns (5)–(8) include the specific groups involved; (6) political militias are armed agents to influence political processes; (7)
communal militias are (ethnic or religious) groups engaged in local political competition; (8) rebels are political organizations to counter an established national government. Columns
(9)–(10) present results for the specific dyadic interaction of actors involved. The main explanatory variable is the monthly revenue allocation to a local government council. The instrumental
variable estimation in Panel (B) uses the index weight interacted with the oil price as instrument. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for two way clustering by time and LGA
level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 2: Resource rents and conflict – moderating effect of having an elected local government
Type of Event Groups involved Between Pol. Militias &...
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Overall Battle Civilian Violence Protest Military Pol. Militia Comm. Militia Rebels Military Civilians
Panel A: OLS
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.213*** 0.115*** 0.141*** 0.009 0.118*** 0.187*** 0.054** -0.011 0.097** 0.140***
(0.073) (0.043) (0.049) (0.030) (0.042) (0.060) (0.024) (0.008) (0.037) (0.051)
Elected × LGC Statutory Allocations -0.131* -0.083** -0.084* -0.006 -0.086** -0.128** -0.045** 0.026*** -0.082** -0.111**
(0.068) (0.041) (0.047) (0.040) (0.043) (0.057) (0.020) (0.009) (0.039) (0.049)
Joint Test:
Allocations + Elected x Allocations = 0 .082 .031 .057** .003 .033 .059* .009 .015** .015 .029
(.054) (.024) (.027) (.037) (.029) (.034) (.015) (.007) (.02) (.025)
Observations 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .0239 .00906 .0112 .00507 .0084 .0133 .00491 .000981 .00487 .00828
Panel B: IV
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.310*** 0.127** 0.178*** 0.043 0.164*** 0.242*** 0.055** -0.010 0.114** 0.161***
(0.099) (0.052) (0.056) (0.035) (0.055) (0.082) (0.026) (0.015) (0.045) (0.062)
Elected × LGC Statutory Allocations -0.224** -0.114** -0.107** -0.038 -0.153*** -0.183** -0.048* 0.023 -0.112** -0.117**
(0.088) (0.049) (0.053) (0.039) (0.053) (0.077) (0.025) (0.015) (0.044) (0.058)
Joint Test:
Allocations + Elected x Allocations = 0 .086 .013 .071** .006 .011 .059 .007 .013 .002 .044
(.061) (.026) (.031) (.037) (.032) (.041) (.019) (.01) (.022) (.029)
Kleibergen-Paap weak IV 148.2 148.2 148.2 148.2 148.2 148.2 148.2 148.2 148.2 148.2
Observations 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .0239 .00906 .0112 .00507 .0084 .0133 .00491 .000981 .00487 .00828
Notes: Table presents regression results capturing the impact of revenue shocks on conflict incidence during periods when LGAs are elected or appointed. All dependent variables are binary indicators
capturing whether an event occurred in an LGA. All regressions control for state by time fixed effects and local government area (LGA) by elected status fixed effects. The dependent variable includes
(1) any violent conflict event defined as the use of force by a group with a political purpose. Type of events include (2) battles defined as violent interactions between two politically organized armed
groups; (3) violence involving civilians are violent acts by an organized political group against unarmed non-combatants; (4) protests are demonstrations and spontaneous acts of violence by disorganised
groups. Columns (5)–(8) include the specific groups involved; (6) political militias are armed agents to influence political processes; (7) communal militias are (ethnic or religious) groups engaged in local
political competition; (8) rebels are political organizations to counter an established national government. Columns (9)–(10) present results for the specific dyadic interaction of actors involved. The main
explanatory variable is the monthly revenue allocation to a local government council. The variable Elected indicates whether a local government council is elected or appointed in a given month. The
instrumental variable estimation in Panel (B) uses the index weight interacted with the oil price as instrument. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for two way clustering by LGA and time with
stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 3: Resource rents, elected (vs appointed) local governments and individual level
victimization and participation in conflict
Fear of political violence Physically attacked Engage in violence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A:
LGC Allocations 6 months prior to survey 0.330 0.342* 0.090 0.105* 0.046 0.067*
(0.206) (0.200) (0.055) (0.057) (0.029) (0.034)
Elected × LGC Allocations 6 months prior to survey -0.138 -0.135 -0.087** -0.099** -0.031 -0.052*
(0.117) (0.118) (0.044) (0.046) (0.024) (0.028)
Observations 4570 4498 13823 12331 6837 5446
Number of LGCs 367 367 575 574 359 357
Mean of DV .684 .683 .143 .15 .0301 .0272
Panel B:
LGC Allocations 12 months prior to survey 0.135* 0.141* 0.049* 0.059** 0.019 0.028*
(0.082) (0.080) (0.026) (0.027) (0.014) (0.016)
Elected × LGC Allocations 12 months prior to survey -0.064 -0.063 -0.046** -0.052** -0.013 -0.022*
(0.051) (0.052) (0.020) (0.021) (0.011) (0.013)
Observations 4570 4498 13823 12331 6837 5446
Number of LGCs 367 367 575 574 359 357
Mean of DV .684 .683 .143 .15 .0301 .0272
Panel C:
LGC Allocations 18 months prior to survey 0.102* 0.105** 0.036** 0.042** 0.013 0.019*
(0.054) (0.052) (0.018) (0.018) (0.009) (0.010)
Elected × LGC Allocations 18 months prior to survey -0.049 -0.048 -0.032** -0.036*** -0.009 -0.015*
(0.034) (0.034) (0.013) (0.014) (0.007) (0.009)
Observations 4570 4498 13823 12331 6837 5446
Number of LGCs 367 367 575 574 359 357
Mean of DV .684 .683 .143 .15 .0301 .0272
Respondent controls X X X
Notes: Table presents regression results using individual level data from the Afrobaromter. All regressions control for time fixed effects and local
government area (LGA) fixed effects. The dependent variables in column (1)–(2) indicates how much a respondent personally fears to become a victim
of political intimidation or violence; columns (3)–(4) indicates how often the respondent or someone in the respondent’s family has been physically
attacked in the past year; columns (5)–(6) indicates whether how often respondent has used force or violence for a political cause. Panel (A) uses the
sum of monthly revenue allocations in the last 6 months, Panel (B) in the last 12 months, and Panel (C) in the last 18 months. The variable Elected
indicates whether a local government council is elected or appointed in a given month. Respondent controls include the respondents age, educational
attainment, employment status, gender and an indicator whether the household lives in an urban area. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by
LGA level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 4: Inclusion of Ethnic Groups Through Elections and Conflict: Estimation of effect on conflict levels
Type of Event Groups involved Between Pol. Militias &...
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Overall Battle Civilian Violence Protest Military Pol. Militia Comm. Militia Rebels Military Civilians
Panel A: Level effect
Elected -0.007** -0.004** -0.006*** 0.001 -0.004** -0.009*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.005*** -0.007***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 148428 148428 148428 148428 148428 148428 148428 148428 148428 148428
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .0251 .0093 .0116 .00566 .0087 .0137 .00519 .000936 .00509 .00862
Panel B: Ethnic alignment heterogenous effect
Elected -0.001 -0.003* -0.002 0.005** -0.004** -0.005*** 0.002 -0.001* -0.004*** -0.004**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Elected x Above Median Non-aligned ethnic group sh. -0.041** -0.009 -0.027*** -0.017* -0.008 -0.029*** -0.008 0.004* -0.010 -0.024***
(0.016) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.002) (0.007) (0.009)
Observations 127130 127130 127130 127130 127130 127130 127130 127130 127130 127130
Number of LGCs 706 706 706 706 706 706 706 706 706 706
Mean of DV .0243 .00934 .0115 .00491 .00836 .0135 .00515 .00106 .00485 .00857
Notes: Table presents regression results documenting that LGAs with elected local governments experience lower conflict levels and that this effect is driven by places that may have seen significant political exclusion
during the periods in which LGAs were appointed. All dependent variables are binary indicators capturing whether an event occurred in an LGA. All regressions control for local government area (LGA) fixed effects
and time fixed effects. The dependent variable includes (1) any violent conflict event defined as the use of force by a group with a political purpose. Type of events include (2) battles defined as violent interactions between
two politically organized armed groups; (3) violence involving civilians are violent acts by an organized political group against unarmed non-combatants; (4) protests are demonstrations and spontaneous acts of violence
by disorganised groups. Columns (5)–(8) include the specific groups involved; (6) political militias are armed agents to influence political processes; (7) communal militias are (ethnic or religious) groups engaged in local
political competition; (8) rebels are political organizations to counter an established national government. Columns (9)–(10) present results for the specific dyadic interaction of actors involved. The main explanatory variable
Elected indicates whether a local government council is elected or appointed in a given month. The variable Non-aligned ethnic group measures the population share that is of a different ethnic group than the state governor.
Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for two way clustering by LGA and time with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 5: Inclusion of Ethnic Groups Through Elections and Conflict: Triple Difference-in-Differences with Allocated Rents
Type of Event Groups involved Between Pol. Militias &...
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Overall Battle Civilian Violence Protest Military Pol. Militia Comm. Militia Rebels Military Civilians
Panel A: Impact of allocations on conflict with appointed LGAs and and Exclusion
LGC Statutory Allocations ×
Above Median Non-aligned ethnic group sh. 0.382*** 0.171*** 0.261*** 0.010 0.183*** 0.353*** 0.088*** -0.004 0.164*** 0.249***
(0.094) (0.057) (0.066) (0.037) (0.055) (0.082) (0.030) (0.007) (0.050) (0.067)
Below Median Non-aligned ethnic group sh. 0.308*** 0.132** 0.199*** 0.004 0.137*** 0.274*** 0.074*** -0.001 0.120*** 0.184***
(0.090) (0.053) (0.061) (0.034) (0.051) (0.078) (0.027) (0.007) (0.046) (0.062)
Joint Test:
Above Median - Below Median = 0 .074*** .039*** .062*** .005 .047*** .078*** .014** -.003 .044*** .066***
(.022) (.014) (.016) (.009) (.015) (.02) (.006) (.002) (.014) (.016)
Observations 45789 45789 45789 45789 45789 45789 45789 45789 45789 45789
Number of LGCs 706 706 706 706 706 706 706 706 706 706
Mean of DV .0303 .0117 .016 .00467 .0112 .02 .00524 .0012 .00795 .0133
Panel B: Impact of allocations with elected vs. appointed LGAs and differential exclusion
LGC Statutory Allocations ×
Elected x Above Median Non-aligned ethnic group sh. 0.172*** 0.051* 0.100*** 0.032 0.080*** 0.096** 0.045** 0.009* 0.039** 0.060**
(0.060) (0.027) (0.030) (0.026) (0.027) (0.039) (0.022) (0.005) (0.018) (0.027)
Appointed x Above Median Non-aligned ethnic group sh. 0.331*** 0.142*** 0.221*** 0.031 0.163*** 0.278*** 0.059** 0.004 0.131*** 0.196***
(0.072) (0.040) (0.046) (0.026) (0.040) (0.058) (0.025) (0.005) (0.034) (0.046)
Elected x Below Median Non-aligned ethnic group sh. 0.192*** 0.042 0.100*** 0.067** 0.069*** 0.079* 0.051* 0.011 0.027 0.044
(0.062) (0.029) (0.032) (0.030) (0.022) (0.041) (0.027) (0.008) (0.017) (0.031)
Appointed x Below Median Non-aligned ethnic group sh. 0.182*** 0.067** 0.104*** 0.028 0.073*** 0.132*** 0.027 0.010* 0.051** 0.080**
(0.063) (0.030) (0.035) (0.025) (0.028) (0.046) (0.022) (0.005) (0.021) (0.033)
Joint Test:
Elected Above Median - Appointed Above Median = 0 -.159*** -.09*** -.121*** .001 -.082*** -.182*** -.015 .005 -.092*** -.136***
(.044) (.03) (.032) (.014) (.03) (.04) (.014) (.004) (.028) (.032)
Observations 127130 127130 127130 127130 127130 127130 127130 127130 127130 127130
Number of LGCs 706 706 706 706 706 706 706 706 706 706
Mean of DV .0243 .00934 .0115 .00491 .00836 .0135 .00515 .00106 .00485 .00857
Notes: Table presents regression results documenting that the impact of revenue shocks driving conflict is most pronounced in periods and places were LGAs are appointed and where there may be significant share of
population excluded (Panel A). Panel B documents that these places are seeing the most drastic weakening of the revenue shocks and conflict relationship. The variable Elected indicates whether a local government council is
elected or appointed in a given month. The variable Non-aligned ethnic group measures the population share that is of a different ethnic group than the state governor. LGC Allocations captures the monthly revenue allocation
to a local government council. All dependent variables are binary indicators capturing whether an event occurred in an LGA. All regressions control for local government area (LGA) by election status fixed effects and time
fixed effects. Panel A focuses on the the sample with appointed local governments, while Panel B studies the full sample. The dependent variable includes (1) any violent conflict event defined as the use of force by a group
with a political purpose. Type of events include (2) battles defined as violent interactions between two politically organized armed groups; (3) violence involving civilians are violent acts by an organized political group against
unarmed non-combatants; (4) protests are demonstrations and spontaneous acts of violence by disorganised groups. Columns (5)–(8) include the specific groups involved; (6) political militias are armed agents to influence political
processes; (7) communal militias are (ethnic or religious) groups engaged in local political competition; (8) rebels are political organizations to counter an established national government. Columns (9)–(10) present results for
the specific dyadic interaction of actors involved. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for two way clustering by LGA and time with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 6: Individual Level Perception of Local Governance
Approval of LGC Council LGC Councillors corrupt Trust in LGC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: 6 months
LGC Allocations 6 months prior to survey -0.338*** -0.337*** 0.397*** 0.384** -0.257** -0.238*
(0.122) (0.124) (0.150) (0.151) (0.125) (0.143)
Elected × LGC Allocations 6 months prior to survey 0.233** 0.208** -0.203* -0.188* 0.197** 0.170*
(0.102) (0.097) (0.104) (0.104) (0.085) (0.088)
Observations 12670 11284 9032 8902 13054 11614
Number of LGCs 573 572 522 522 575 574
Mean of DV 2.84 2.9 3.77 3.78 2.51 2.58
Panel B: 12 months
LGC Allocations 12 months prior to survey -0.165*** -0.165*** 0.174*** 0.168** -0.108* -0.098
(0.059) (0.060) (0.067) (0.068) (0.056) (0.063)
Elected × LGC Allocations 12 months prior to survey 0.114** 0.103** -0.094** -0.088* 0.084** 0.071*
(0.047) (0.045) (0.047) (0.047) (0.039) (0.039)
Observations 12670 11284 9032 8902 13054 11614
Number of LGCs 573 572 522 522 575 574
Mean of DV 2.84 2.9 3.77 3.78 2.51 2.58
Panel C: 18 months
LGC Allocations 18 months prior to survey -0.110*** -0.110*** 0.120*** 0.117*** -0.075** -0.066
(0.040) (0.041) (0.044) (0.044) (0.037) (0.041)
Elected × LGC Allocations 18 months prior to survey 0.076** 0.068** -0.065** -0.061** 0.057** 0.047*
(0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.026) (0.026)
Observations 12670 11284 9032 8902 13054 11614
Number of LGCs 573 572 522 522 575 574
Mean of DV 2.84 2.9 3.77 3.78 2.51 2.58
Respondent controls X X X
Notes: All regressions control for time fixed effects and local government area (LGA) fixed effects. The dependent variable in columns (1)–(2) indicates
how much a respondent approves of the performance of the local government councillor (4-point Likert scale); in columns (3)–(4) it captures how many of
the local councillors a respondent thinks are involved in corruption; columns (5)–(6) indicates how much a respondent trusts the local government council
(4-point Likert scale). Panel (A) uses the sum of monthly revenue allocations in the last 6 months, Panel (B) in the last 12 months, and Panel (C) in the
last 18 months. The variable Elected indicates whether a local government council is elected or appointed in a given month. Respondent controls include
the respondents age, educational attainment, employment status, gender and an indicator whether the household lives in an urban area. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered by LGA level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Figure A1: Conflict around election months
Notes: The figure presents estimated coefficients from a regression with the left hand side being a dummy variable
indicating whether there was any conflict event in an LGA and month. The regression removes LGA fixed effects and
time fixed effects prior and then regresses the residualized dependent variable on a set of dummies capturing the time
to the election date. Standard errors are clustered at the LGA level and 10% confidence bands are indicated.
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Figure A2: Conventional test for non-linearities
(a): Appointed Local Council (b): Elected Local Council
Notes: The figures are constructed by demeaning the conflict outcome as well as the Gross Statutory Allocations by the location and time fixed effects, sub-setting the sample into two
parts: one with elected and one with appointed local governments. The residuals of the allocations are subdivided into quintiles and we then estimate a simple specification using the
quintiles as categorical right hand side measures. The resulting point estimates per quintile are plotted out. The figure displays the effect of LGC Gross Statutory Allocations per month
on civil conflict by quintile of the shock without (left) and with (right) elected LGC. 90% confidence intervals obtained from clustering standard errors two way by time and state are
indicated.
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Figure A3: Leave-one-out validation: Dropping each state in turn




























































Main effect Interaction effect




































































Main effect Interaction effect
Notes: The figure presents results from a leave-one-out exercise. We estimate the main regression including state-by-time and district fixed effects but drop all data pertaining to each of
the 37 individual states in turn. The boxplots provide the distribution of the point estimates that are obtained for both the reduced form as well as the instrumental variable estimation.
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-.1 0 .1 .2
Distribution of point estimates
Notes: Permutation test on the interaction effect between gross statutory allocations and the elected status
dummy. 100 permutations were constructed by randomly reordering spells of appointed vs elected govern-
ments at the LGA level. Each model is estimated including state by time and LGA fixed effects. The dashed
blue line represents the main effect that is estimated on the LGA Allocations variable, while the red vertical
line indicates the estimate that is obtained on the Elected x LGA Allocations interaction with the true data.
The kernel density plots the distribution of the point estimates for the reshuffled Elected x LGA Allocations
interaction variable. It is clear that we can safely reject the null hypothesis with a p-value of less than 0.001.
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Distribution of point estimates
Notes: Permutation test after permuting the election status dummy across the 37 states, thus ignoring part
of the local variation. 100 permutations were constructed by randomly reordering spells of appointed vs
elected governments at the state level. Each model is estimated including time and LGA fixed effects. The
dashed blue line represents the main effect that is estimated on the LGA Allocations variable, while the red
vertical line indicates the estimate that is obtained on the Elected x LGA Allocations interaction with the
true data. The kernel density plots the distribution of the point estimates for the reshuffled Elected x LGA
Allocations interaction variable. We can reject the null hypothesis of no effect with a p-value of 0.05.
Table A1: Revenue Allocation Formula
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Equality 0.138 0
Population 0.104 0.058
Internal Revenue Generation effort 0.009 0.004
Landmass 0.017 0.021
Terrain 0.017 0
Health - Hospital Beds 0.01 0.005
Education - Primary enrollment 0.014 0.008
Rain - Water supply spread 0.005 0.006
Rain - Rainfall share 0.005 0
Total index 0.345 0.068
N 774
Notes: Mean and Standard deviation of the different sub-indices that feed into the
overall index weight used to allocate revenues to local government areas (revenue al-
location formula of 2006). Source: Federation Account Allocation Committee (FAAC).
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Figure A6: Distribution of Ethnic Groups across Nigeria




Notes: The map shows the distribution of ethnic groups across Nigeria. For each local government area the largest ethnic
group is displayed in a different colour. The largest groups are the Yoruba in light blue (South-West), the Hausa-Fulani in
pink (North), and the Igbo/Ibo in yellow (South-East) Sources: own calculations based on ethnic information in the Demo-
graphic Health Surveys. Administrative boundaries are from Global Administrative Areas (GADM; https://gadm.org/)
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Figure A7: Population Shares of various ethnic groups in Akwa Ibom and Taraba states
Panel A: Akwa Ibom State


















(a) Ibibio (b) Oron
Panel B: Taraba State
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(a) Hausa-Fulani (b) Mumuye
Notes: Panel A presents population shares for the (a) Ibibio and (b) Oron ethnic groups across local government areas in Akwa Ibom
State. Panel B presents population shares for the (a) Hausa-Fulani and (b) Mumuye ethnic groups across local government areas
in Taraba State. Sources: Population shares of ethnic groups across local government areas are calculated based on respondents’
information on ethnicity and language in 5 Demographic Health Surveys (1990, 2003, 2008, 2010, 2013). Administrative boundaries
are from Global Administrative Areas (GADM; https://gadm.org/).
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Table A2: Within- and between LGA variation in different types of FAAC
Allocations
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Observations
Total Allocations overall 0.305 0.243 N = 140868
between 0.074 n = 774
within 0.231 T = 182
Statutory Allocations overall 0.206 0.122 N = 140868
between 0.040 n = 774
within 0.115 T = 182
Extraordinary Allocations overall 0.056 0.131 N = 140868
between 0.011 n = 774
within 0.131 T = 182
Notes: The table presents a decomposition of the variation in the Federation Account
Allocation Committee (FAAC) allocations within- and between LGA’s. Statutory Allo-
cations are calculated based on a benchmark oil price defined at the beginning of each
year. Extraordinary Allocations are additional revenue transfers from the Excess Crude
Account (ECA) based on the same allocation formula defined by the FAAC. These allo-
cations are subject to idiosyncratic political decisions. Source: information on monthly
allocations is published by the FAAC.
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Table A3: Conflict in Oil-Producing States and Oil Fields
Type of Event Groups involved Between pol militias &...
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Overall Battle Civilian Violence Protest Military Pol Militia Comm militia Rebels Military Civilians
Panel A: Oil producing state
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.255*** 0.142*** 0.147** 0.018 0.143*** 0.220*** 0.070** -0.004 0.119** 0.139**
(0.088) (0.054) (0.056) (0.038) (0.053) (0.073) (0.029) (0.004) (0.048) (0.064)
LGA is in Oil Producing State × LGC Statutory Allocations -0.118 -0.174* 0.043 -0.007 -0.162 -0.140 -0.035 -0.042 -0.134 -0.016
(0.178) (0.095) (0.095) (0.092) (0.102) (0.125) (0.042) (0.045) (0.083) (0.088)
Observations 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662
Number of LGCs 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768
Mean of DV .0292 .0112 .0152 .00471 .0108 .0191 .00495 .00105 .00767 .0127
Panel B: LGA with Oil field
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.236*** 0.116** 0.154*** 0.016 0.118** 0.200*** 0.065** -0.009 0.099** 0.137**
(0.077) (0.048) (0.051) (0.034) (0.046) (0.063) (0.027) (0.007) (0.042) (0.055)
LGA has Oil Field × LGC Statutory Allocations 0.040 -0.002 -0.006 0.037 0.024 -0.013 -0.012 -0.013 0.000 -0.014
(0.055) (0.029) (0.030) (0.034) (0.026) (0.037) (0.028) (0.008) (0.017) (0.024)
Observations 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662 49662
Number of LGCs 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768
Mean of DV .0292 .0112 .0152 .00471 .0108 .0191 .00495 .00105 .00767 .0127
Notes: Table presents regression results exploring whether LGAs with oil production activity exhibit a different relationship between revenue shocks and conflict. All regressions control for local government area (LGA)
by elected status fixed effects and state by time fixed effects. All dependent variables are binary indicators capturing whether an event occurred in an LGA. The dependent variable includes (1) any violent conflict event
defined as the use of force by a group with a political purpose. Type of events include (2) battles defined as violent interactions between two politically organized armed groups; (3) violence involving civilians are violent acts
by an organized political group against unarmed non-combatants; (4) protests are demonstrations and spontaneous acts of violence by disorganised groups. Columns (5)–(8) include the specific groups involved; (6) political
militias are armed agents to influence political processes; (7) communal militias are (ethnic or religious) groups engaged in local political competition; (8) rebels are political organizations to counter an established national
government. Columns (9)–(10) present results for the specific dyadic interaction of actors involved. In Panel (A) the monthly statutory allocation are interacted with a dummy variable indicating whether a LGA is in a state
that has any oil-producing facilities; in Panel (B) it is interacted with a dummy variable indicating whether a LGA has any oil field. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered twoway by LGA and time level with stars
indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A4: Decomposition of Allocations by Type and Oil Price used
Overall Allocations Statutory allocations Extra allocations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Brent Crude Oil Price
Total index × brent 18.497*** 18.496*** 18.494*** 8.709*** 8.709*** 8.706*** 5.068*** 5.068*** 5.070***
(2.567) (1.861) (1.963) (0.479) (0.465) (0.397) (0.991) (0.991) (1.175)
LGC FE X X X X X X
Time FE X X X
R2 .693 .712 .972 .828 .833 .987 .203 .204 .967
Observations 140784 140784 140784 140784 140784 140784 140784 140784 140784
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .305 .305 .305 .206 .206 .206 .0564 .0564 .0564
Panel B: NG Oil production
Total index × Monthly Nigerian crude production 1.209*** 1.209*** 1.209*** 0.759*** 0.759*** 0.759*** 0.141 0.141 0.141
(0.392) (0.388) (0.357) (0.177) (0.178) (0.148) (0.202) (0.202) (0.194)
LGC FE X X X X X X
Time FE X X X
R2 .132 .151 .943 .228 .233 .964 .00875 .00917 .959
Observations 140784 140784 140784 140784 140784 140784 140784 140784 140784
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .305 .305 .305 .206 .206 .206 .0564 .0564 .0564
Notes: Table presents regression results representing a decomposition of the allocation variable using different sets of fixed effects across columns. The dependent variable in
columns (1)–(3) is the Overall Allocation determined by the horizontal allocation formula (index) for each local government council; in columns (4)–(6) the Statutory Allocations
calculated based on a benchmark oil price set at the beginning of each year; in columns (7)–(9) the Extraordinary Allocations that are additional revenue transfers from the
Excess Crude Account (ECA). The explanatory variable in Panel (A) is an interaction between the total index weight in the allocation formula times the monthly Brent Crude
Oil price; in Panel (B) it is an interaction between the total index weight times the monthly Nigerian crude oil production. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for two
way clustering by time and state-governor with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A5: Robustness: Removing election related violence from estimating sample
Type of Event Groups involved Between Pol. Militias &...
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Overall Battle Civilian Violence Protest Military Pol. Militia Comm. Militia Rebels Military Civilians
Panel A: Removing 1 month window around election
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.217*** 0.111** 0.150*** 0.012 0.112*** 0.189*** 0.062** -0.014 0.096** 0.141***
(0.073) (0.044) (0.049) (0.031) (0.043) (0.060) (0.025) (0.009) (0.039) (0.052)
Elected × LGC Statutory Allocations -0.134* -0.086* -0.090* -0.002 -0.080* -0.134** -0.052** 0.025*** -0.081** -0.108**
(0.073) (0.045) (0.049) (0.042) (0.044) (0.060) (0.023) (0.009) (0.040) (0.050)
Observations 134606 134606 134606 134606 134606 134606 134606 134606 134606 134606
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .0236 .00888 .011 .00504 .00827 .0131 .00484 .000973 .00478 .00822
Panel B: Removing 3 month window around election
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.237*** 0.118** 0.165*** 0.013 0.119** 0.204*** 0.076*** -0.014 0.102** 0.149***
(0.080) (0.047) (0.053) (0.034) (0.047) (0.065) (0.027) (0.010) (0.043) (0.056)
Elected × LGC Statutory Allocations -0.151* -0.093* -0.102* -0.007 -0.080 -0.148** -0.068*** 0.026** -0.081* -0.117**
(0.080) (0.050) (0.054) (0.044) (0.049) (0.066) (0.024) (0.010) (0.045) (0.056)
Observations 126340 126340 126340 126340 126340 126340 126340 126340 126340 126340
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .0237 .00894 .011 .00511 .00828 .0132 .00484 .000966 .0048 .00827
Panel C: Removing 6 month window around election
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.287*** 0.144*** 0.192*** 0.029 0.144*** 0.243*** 0.089*** -0.011 0.122** 0.166***
(0.083) (0.054) (0.055) (0.037) (0.053) (0.068) (0.029) (0.010) (0.048) (0.059)
Elected × LGC Statutory Allocations -0.200** -0.112* -0.127** -0.024 -0.087 -0.188*** -0.076*** 0.025** -0.097* -0.136**
(0.084) (0.058) (0.053) (0.049) (0.058) (0.070) (0.026) (0.010) (0.053) (0.059)
Observations 112506 112506 112506 112506 112506 112506 112506 112506 112506 112506
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .0237 .0089 .011 .00525 .00822 .0131 .00492 .000933 .00474 .00831
Notes: Table presents a robustness check removing data around the actual election to document that the changed relationship between resource shocks and conflicts in LGAs with elected governments is not confounding
any level effects arising due to election related violence. All regressions control for local government area (LGA) by elected status and state by time fixed effects. All dependent variables are binary indicators capturing
whether an event occurred in an LGA. The dependent variable includes (1) any violent conflict event defined as the use of force by a group with a political purpose. Type of events include (2) battles defined as violent
interactions between two politically organized armed groups; (3) violence involving civilians are violent acts by an organized political group against unarmed non-combatants; (4) protests are demonstrations and
spontaneous acts of violence by disorganised groups. Columns (5)–(8) include the specific groups involved; (6) political militias are armed agents to influence political processes; (7) communal militias are (ethnic or
religious) groups engaged in local political competition; (8) rebels are political organizations to counter an established national government. Columns (9)–(10) present results for the specific dyadic interaction of actors
involved. Panel (A) removes the month when a local council election is held from the sample; Panel (B) removes a three months window from the sample; Panel (C) removes a six months window from the sample.
LGC Statutory Allocations the monthly revenue allocation to a local government council. The variable Elected indicates whether a local government council is elected or appointed in a given month. Standard errors in
parentheses are adjusted for two way clustering by time and state-governor with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A6: Variance Decomposition of Local Democracy
Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
R-squared .0817 .571 .67 .972
LGC FE X X X X
Time FE X X
State Governor FE X
State x Time FE X
Observations 148428 148428 145082 148428
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774
Notes: Table presents a decomposition of the variation in the elec-
tion status dummy variable after controlling for different levels of
fixed effects.
Table A7: Residual Variation to Hold Local Elections: Allocations and Conflict
Allocations ACLED
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
LGC Allocations -0.006 0.046
(0.018) (0.078)
LGC Extra Allocations -0.017 -0.050
(0.023) (0.086)
LGC Allocations (last 3 months) -0.002 -0.004
(0.005) (0.006)
LGC Allocations (last 6 months) -0.001 -0.000
(0.003) (0.005)
LGC Allocations (last 12 months) -0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.004)
ACLED events (last 3 months) -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
ACLED events (last 6 months) -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.001)
ACLED events (last 12 months) -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
R2 .967 .967 .967 .966 .966 .967 .967 .967 .966
Observations 140713 140713 138406 136099 131485 148428 148428 148428 131485
Notes: The table presents a series of regressions of the elected status indicator variable (Elected) on the different types of allocations for
different periods prior to local elections, and conflict events prior to local elections. The residuals in the Elected variable are calculated after
controlling for state by time fixed effects and local government (LGA) fixed effects. Column (9) presents the estimation with all relevant
explanatory variables included. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for two way clustering by time and state-governor with stars
indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A8: Residual Variation in Local Elections: Formula Inputs and Ethnicity
Weather Index and Geography Demographics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Temperature -0.002 -0.005*
(0.003) (0.003)
Rainfall (annual avg) -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)






Rain - Water supply spread -44.413 0.000
(249.070) (.)
LGA has Oil Field 0.002 0.008
(0.003) (0.006)
Non-aligned ethnic family 0.010 0.014
(0.007) (0.009)
Non-aligned ethnic group 0.007 0.002
(0.007) (0.008)
Share of LGC population non-aligned w. Gov. religion -0.005 -0.009
(0.008) (0.008)
R2 .967 .967 .967 .967 .967 .967 .967 .966 .966 .967 .968
Observations 148428 148428 148428 148428 148428 148428 148428 131107 131107 126187 123947
Notes: The table presents a series of regressions of the elected status indicator variable (Elected) on two weather indicators in columns (1)–(2), temperature and annual rainfall, on the allocation
index and its sub-indices in columns (3)–(6), on an LGA oil field indicator in column (7), and on three ethnic/religious alignment variables in columns (8)–(10), indicating what share of the
population is aligned with the state governor’s ethnicity and religion, respectively. Column (10) includes all covariates. The residuals in the Elected variable are calculated after controlling for state
by time fixed effects and local government (LGA) fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for two way clustering by time and state-governor with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A9: Sensitivity of results to data where there may have been disruption to revenue sharing
New LGA’s Emergency rule Non-verified claims All instances
Plateau Ekiti Boko Haram
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Dropping State x Month’s which may have been affected by FAAC disruption
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.175*** 0.170*** 0.171*** 0.123*** 0.198*** 0.146***
(0.050) (0.049) (0.050) (0.040) (0.053) (0.043)
Elected × LGC Statutory Allocations -0.094*** -0.095*** -0.096*** -0.062** -0.109*** -0.070***
(0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.025) (0.037) (0.026)
Observations 139560 140594 140601 139222 127439 126263
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .0132 .0133 .0133 .0119 .0132 .012
Panel B: Dropping State x Year’s which may have been affected by FAAC disruption
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.175*** 0.170*** 0.171*** 0.108*** 0.198*** 0.130***
(0.051) (0.049) (0.050) (0.037) (0.053) (0.042)
Elected × LGC Statutory Allocations -0.095*** -0.095*** -0.096*** -0.050** -0.109*** -0.058**
(0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.023) (0.037) (0.025)
Observations 138577 140509 140329 138446 127439 122528
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .0132 .0133 .0133 .0113 .0132 .0113
Panel C: Dropping all data from all states which may have been affected by FAAC disruption
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.197*** 0.171*** 0.174*** 0.110*** 0.353*** 0.235***
(0.058) (0.050) (0.050) (0.040) (0.093) (0.073)
Elected × LGC Statutory Allocations -0.096** -0.100*** -0.099*** -0.063** -0.201*** -0.132***
(0.041) (0.035) (0.034) (0.024) (0.069) (0.047)
Observations 121603 137619 137801 121239 59754 51018
Number of LGCs 669 757 758 667 329 281
Mean of DV .0134 .013 .0134 .0116 .0169 .0142
Notes: Table presents a robustness check removing data from periods where there may have been some disruption to revenue sharing. In Panel A we
drop all data for state and month pairs in which there is some indication that transfers may have been disrupted even if they only affected a select few
individual LGAs within a state. In Panel B we drop all state and year pairs where we know that some LGA by months may have seen some disruption.
In Panel C we drop all data for all states for which we ever noted some disruption. The different reasons for disruptions are indicated in the column
head and further described in the text. Column (5) drops all data that was affected by disruption irrespective of the underlying reason for disruption.
All regressions control for local government area (LGA) by elected status and state by time fixed effects. The dependent variable is a binary indicator
measuring whether an LGA month had a violent event recorded in ACLED. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for two way clustering by LGA
and time with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A10: Robustness: Controlling for State-Governor Specific and Election Status specific LGA Fixed Effects
Type of Event Groups involved Between Pol. Militias &...
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Overall Battle Civilian Violence Protest Military Pol. Militia Comm. Militia Rebels Military Civilians
Panel A: without elected LGCs
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.170** 0.080* 0.134** -0.013 0.046 0.172*** 0.039 -0.007 0.053* 0.155***
(0.075) (0.041) (0.056) (0.044) (0.040) (0.056) (0.033) (0.016) (0.032) (0.053)
Observations 50021 50021 50021 50021 50021 50021 50021 50021 50021 50021
Number of LGCs 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768
Mean of DV .0294 .0112 .0152 .0047 .0109 .0193 .00496 .0011 .00774 .0127
Panel B: with elected LGCs
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.193*** 0.067** 0.106*** 0.046* 0.060** 0.113*** 0.045* 0.005 0.035* 0.082***
(0.059) (0.029) (0.037) (0.026) (0.027) (0.039) (0.026) (0.008) (0.020) (0.031)
Elected × LGC Statutory Allocations -0.046 -0.030* -0.035* 0.010 -0.009 -0.068*** -0.003 -0.005 -0.021 -0.056***
(0.031) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.020) (0.013) (0.005) (0.013) (0.016)
Observations 139537 139537 139537 139537 139537 139537 139537 139537 139537 139537
Number of LGCs 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768 768
Mean of DV .0233 .00895 .011 .00471 .00808 .013 .00489 .000982 .00474 .00812
Notes: Table documents that results are similar when controlling for a separate set of district fixed effects for each state governor and for whether an LGA has an elected or appointed LGA. This
amounts to estimating, on average, more than five different sets of LGA fixed effects and introduces a large number of irrelevant controls understandably inflating the variance. The dependent
variable includes (1) any violent conflict event defined as the use of force by a group with a political purpose. Type of events include (2) battles defined as violent interactions between two politically
organized armed groups; (3) violence involving civilians are violent acts by an organized political group against unarmed non-combatants; (4) protests are demonstrations and spontaneous acts
of violence by disorganised groups. Columns (5)–(8) include the specific groups involved; (6) political militias are armed agents to influence political processes; (7) communal militias are (ethnic or
religious) groups engaged in local political competition; (8) rebels are political organizations to counter an established national government. Columns (9)–(10) present results for the specific dyadic
interaction of actors involved. Panel (A) presents estimation results for periods with an appointed local government council (LGC), and Panel (B) includes periods with an elected LGC. The main
explanatory variable is the monthly allocation to a LGC. The variable Elected indicates whether a LGC is elected or appointed in a given month. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for two
way clustering by LGA and time with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A11: Dropping all data from states that may have been impacted by the Boko Haram insurgency: Resource rents and conflict – moderating effect of
having an elected local government
Type of Event Groups involved Between Pol. Militias &...
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Overall Battle Civilian Violence Protest Military Pol. Militia Comm. Militia Rebels Military Civilians
Panel A: Dropping Yobe, Borno, Adamawa
LGC Allocations 0.084*** 0.022 0.041*** 0.017 0.025* 0.067*** 0.007 -0.002 0.018 0.044**
(0.031) (0.015) (0.012) (0.016) (0.013) (0.022) (0.008) (0.004) (0.011) (0.018)
Elected × LGC Allocations -0.044* -0.012 -0.014* -0.004 -0.015 -0.047** -0.005 0.005* -0.022* -0.027*
(0.023) (0.018) (0.008) (0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.007) (0.003) (0.013) (0.014)
Observations 128883 128883 128883 128883 128883 128883 128883 128883 128883 128883
Number of LGCs 709 709 709 709 709 709 709 709 709 709
Mean of DV .0229 .00821 .0102 .00542 .00747 .0117 .00493 .00107 .00373 .00708
Panel B: Dropping Yobe, Borno, Adamawa, Niger and Plateau
LGC Allocations 0.084*** 0.022 0.040*** 0.016 0.024* 0.068*** 0.006 -0.002 0.019 0.043**
(0.031) (0.016) (0.011) (0.017) (0.014) (0.022) (0.008) (0.005) (0.012) (0.019)
Elected × LGC Allocations -0.047** -0.012 -0.013* -0.006 -0.017 -0.051** -0.005 0.006* -0.025* -0.026*
(0.024) (0.019) (0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.020) (0.007) (0.003) (0.014) (0.014)
Observations 121239 121239 121239 121239 121239 121239 121239 121239 121239 121239
Number of LGCs 667 667 667 667 667 667 667 667 667 667
Mean of DV .0226 .008 .00974 .00552 .00734 .0116 .00428 .00112 .00372 .00695
Notes: Table presents regression results suggesting that the observed effects are robust to dropping data pertaining to states that may have been affected by the Boko Haram insurgency.
All regressions control for local government area (LGA) by elected status and state by time fixed effects. The dependent variable includes (1) any violent conflict event defined as the
use of force by a group with a political purpose. Type of events include (2) battles defined as violent interactions between two politically organized armed groups; (3) violence involving
civilians are violent acts by an organized political group against unarmed non-combatants; (4) protests are demonstrations and spontaneous acts of violence by disorganised groups.
Columns (5)–(8) include the specific groups involved; (6) political militias are armed agents to influence political processes; (7) communal militias are (ethnic or religious) groups engaged
in local political competition; (8) rebels are political organizations to counter an established national government. Columns (9)–(10) present results for the specific dyadic interaction of
actors involved. The main explanatory variable is the monthly revenue allocation to a local government council. The variable Elected indicates whether a local government council is
elected or appointed in a given month. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for two way clustering by LGA and time with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A12: LGA Extraordinary Allocations and Conflict
Type of Event Groups involved Between Pol. Militias &...
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Overall Battle Civilian Violence Protest Military Pol. Militia Comm. Militia Rebels Military Civilians
Panel A: OLS
LGC Extra Allocations 0.077** 0.046* 0.026 0.029 0.030 0.074*** -0.009 -0.013* 0.025 0.042**
(0.034) (0.025) (0.016) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.008) (0.007) (0.019) (0.019)
Elected × LGC Extra Allocations -0.038 -0.037 -0.014 0.000 -0.030 -0.061* 0.007 0.015** -0.037 -0.028*
(0.036) (0.036) (0.013) (0.009) (0.027) (0.032) (0.010) (0.007) (0.022) (0.016)
Joint Test:
Allocations + Elected x Allocations = 0 .039 .01 .012 .029 0 .013 -.002 .002 -.012 .014
(.039) (.022) (.016) (.019) (.017) (.023) (.007) (.005) (.01) (.013)
Observations 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .0239 .00906 .0112 .00507 .0084 .0133 .00491 .000981 .00487 .00828
Panel B: IV
LGC Extra Allocations 0.563** 0.231** 0.324** 0.079 0.299** 0.441** 0.100 -0.018 0.208** 0.293**
(0.252) (0.109) (0.147) (0.068) (0.137) (0.196) (0.061) (0.025) (0.101) (0.146)
Elected × LGC Extra Allocations -0.421** -0.208** -0.208* -0.069 -0.277** -0.341** -0.087 0.038 -0.201** -0.220*
(0.208) (0.096) (0.123) (0.070) (0.128) (0.167) (0.056) (0.026) (0.096) (0.128)
Joint Test:
Allocations + Elected x Allocations = 0 .142 .023 .116** .01 .022 .099 .012 .02 .006 .073
(.1) (.041) (.057) (.058) (.05) (.069) (.03) (.018) (.035) (.047)
Kleibergen-Paap weak IV 4.17 4.17 4.17 4.17 4.17 4.17 4.17 4.17 4.17 4.17
Observations 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .0239 .00906 .0112 .00507 .0084 .0133 .00491 .000981 .00487 .00828
Notes: Table focuses on the extraordinary revenue allocations as a shock measure contrasting with the automatically triggered statutory allocations studied in the main paper. All regressions control
for local government area (LGA) by elected status fixed effects and state by time fixed effects. The dependent variable includes (1) any violent conflict event defined as the use of force by a group with a
political purpose. Type of events include (2) battles defined as violent interactions between two politically organized armed groups; (3) violence involving civilians are violent acts by an organized political
group against unarmed non-combatants; (4) protests are demonstrations and spontaneous acts of violence by disorganised groups. Columns (5)–(8) include the specific groups involved; (6) political
militias are armed agents to influence political processes; (7) communal militias are (ethnic or religious) groups engaged in local political competition; (8) rebels are political organizations to counter an
established national government. Columns (9)–(10) present results for the specific dyadic interaction of actors involved. The variable LGC Extra Allocations indicates the extraordinary allocations to each
local government council from the Excess Crude Account (ECA) on a monthly basis. Extraordinary allocations are based on idiosyncratic political decisions. The variable Elected indicates whether a
local government council is elected or appointed in a given month. The instrumental variable estimation in Panel (B) uses the index weight interacted with the oil price as instrument. Standard errors
in parentheses are adjusted for two way clustering by LGA and time with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A13: Effect of Resource rents on civil conflict: Alternative conflict data
ACLED UCDP GED GTD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Events Fatalities Non Boko Haram Events Fatalities Events Fatalities
Panel A: Any conflict
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.279*** 0.206*** 0.100*** 0.166*** 0.140*** 0.159*** 0.144***
(0.061) (0.045) (0.027) (0.046) (0.039) (0.042) (0.040)
Elected × LGC Statutory Allocations -0.063** -0.060*** -0.030*** -0.071*** -0.069*** -0.073*** -0.068***
(0.027) (0.021) (0.011) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020)
Observations 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .0239 .0121 .0106 .00703 .00465 .00767 .00671
Panel B: Levels
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.642*** 5.705*** 0.122*** 0.424** 3.444** 0.344*** 4.509*
(0.190) (1.825) (0.036) (0.186) (1.411) (0.121) (2.601)
Elected × LGC Statutory Allocations -0.143 -3.017*** -0.044*** -0.224** -2.257*** -0.186*** -3.160***
(0.098) (1.049) (0.016) (0.100) (0.865) (0.062) (1.192)
Observations 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713 140713
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .0405 .224 .0134 .0133 .0735 .0127 .189
Notes: Table documents that we find similar results when studying alternative conflict event data. The dependent variable in columns (1)–(3) is
based on the ACLED data; in columns (4)–(5) on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Geo-referenced Event Data, and in columns (6)–(7) on the Global
Terrorism Database. All regressions control for time fixed effects and local government area (LGA) fixed effects. Columns (1), (4), and (6) indicate
any conflict event; columns (2), (5), and (7) indicate the number of fatalities in conflict; column (3) only includes conflict events that are not associated
with the Jihadist militant organization “Boko Haram” in northeastern Nigeria. The variable LGC Statutory Allocations captures the monthly revenue
allocations to each local government council. The variable Elected indicates whether a local government council is elected or appointed in a given
month. Panel (A) reports results for any conflict event, and Panel (B) conflict levels. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the
LGA with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A14: Effect of Resource rents on civil conflict: Different transformations of dependent variables
Type of Event Groups involved Between Pol. Militias &...
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Overall Battle Civilian Violence Protest Military Pol. Militia Comm. Militia Rebels Military Civilians
Panel A: Any conflict
LGC Gross Statutory Allocations 0.061*** 0.039*** 0.063*** 0.018* 0.058*** 0.067*** 0.019* 0.005 0.053*** 0.050***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.014) (0.016) (0.010) (0.003) (0.012) (0.013)
Elected × LGC Gross Statutory Allocations -0.022*** -0.008 -0.023*** 0.007 -0.021*** -0.023*** 0.004 -0.001 -0.022*** -0.024***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.001) (0.005) (0.006)
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .139 .0689 .079 .0341 .0599 .0889 .0415 .00728 .0366 .0614
Panel B: Levels
LGC Gross Statutory Allocations 0.626*** 0.174*** 0.252*** 0.071 0.218*** 0.427*** 0.079** 0.010 0.166*** 0.227***
(0.192) (0.062) (0.072) (0.059) (0.071) (0.145) (0.035) (0.008) (0.059) (0.080)
Elected × LGC Gross Statutory Allocations -0.130 -0.069** -0.089*** 0.048 -0.070** -0.201*** 0.011 -0.000 -0.084*** -0.106***
(0.079) (0.027) (0.029) (0.034) (0.031) (0.059) (0.014) (0.003) (0.027) (0.031)
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .516 .153 .189 .0968 .149 .262 .0875 .0145 .0868 .142
Panel C: log(Levels per capita)
LGC Gross Statutory Allocations 0.121*** 0.053*** 0.082*** 0.019 0.072*** 0.102*** 0.027** 0.005 0.059*** 0.068***
(0.026) (0.015) (0.017) (0.013) (0.016) (0.024) (0.013) (0.004) (0.013) (0.018)
Elected × LGC Gross Statutory Allocations -0.032*** -0.016** -0.029*** 0.011 -0.023*** -0.042*** 0.003 -0.000 -0.026*** -0.032***
(0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.001) (0.006) (0.007)
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV -.315 -.412 -.4 -.443 -.419 -.386 -.439 -.473 -.444 -.42
Panel C: Levels per capita
LGC Gross Statutory Allocations 0.173 0.082** 0.079* -0.019 0.078* 0.156* 0.034** 0.003 0.071* 0.076
(0.108) (0.039) (0.044) (0.024) (0.047) (0.093) (0.016) (0.004) (0.040) (0.049)
Elected × LGC Gross Statutory Allocations -0.091* -0.043** -0.049** 0.013 -0.048** -0.108*** 0.002 0.001 -0.050*** -0.054***
(0.048) (0.019) (0.019) (0.015) (0.021) (0.041) (0.007) (0.002) (0.019) (0.020)
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .31 .0952 .116 .0534 .0898 .166 .0529 .00816 .0563 .0892
Notes: Table presents regression results documenting that we find similar results when exploring different transformations of the dependent variable. To study the intensive margin the data is aggregated to
the yearly level. All regressions control for local government area (LGA) by time fixed effects and. The variable LGC Statutory Allocations captures the monthly revenue allocations to each local government
council. The variable Elected indicates whether a local government council is elected or appointed in a given month. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the LGA level with stars
indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A15: Different temporal resolution of the data
Type of Event Groups involved Between Pol. Militias &...
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Overall Battle Civilian Violence Protest Military Pol. Militia Comm. Militia Rebels Military Civilians
Panel A: Annual
LGC Gross Statutory Allocations 0.061*** 0.039*** 0.063*** 0.018* 0.058*** 0.067*** 0.019* 0.005 0.053*** 0.050***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.014) (0.016) (0.010) (0.003) (0.012) (0.013)
Elected × LGC Gross Statutory Allocations -0.022*** -0.008 -0.023*** 0.007 -0.021*** -0.023*** 0.004 -0.001 -0.022*** -0.024***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.001) (0.005) (0.006)
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .139 .0689 .079 .0341 .0599 .0889 .0415 .00728 .0366 .0614
Panel B: Quarterly
LGC Gross Statutory Allocations 0.091*** 0.042** 0.079*** 0.019 0.062*** 0.093*** 0.034** 0.003 0.051*** 0.069***
(0.032) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.028) (0.013) (0.005) (0.018) (0.024)
Elected × LGC Gross Statutory Allocations -0.039 -0.020 -0.033** -0.003 -0.036** -0.041** -0.021 0.005 -0.033** -0.036**
(0.025) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.020) (0.013) (0.004) (0.015) (0.018)
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .0566 .0236 .0287 .0133 .0218 .0327 .0134 .00251 .0127 .0212
Panel C: Monthly
LGC Gross Statutory Allocations 0.160*** 0.055** 0.099*** 0.014 0.072** 0.136*** 0.039** 0.003 0.059** 0.094**
(0.053) (0.028) (0.034) (0.026) (0.029) (0.044) (0.016) (0.006) (0.025) (0.038)
Elected × LGC Gross Statutory Allocations -0.081** -0.030 -0.044 -0.001 -0.037 -0.084** -0.027* 0.006 -0.047** -0.062**
(0.041) (0.025) (0.027) (0.023) (0.024) (0.033) (0.016) (0.004) (0.021) (0.028)
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .0251 .0093 .0116 .00566 .0087 .0137 .00519 .000936 .00509 .00862
Notes: Table presents results documenting that the results are robust to studying different temporal resolutions of the data. Panel A focuses on annual aggregation of the data; panel B focuses on quarterly
while Panel C focuses on monthly data. All regressions control for time fixed effects and local government area (LGA) fixed effects. The variable LGC Statutory Allocations captures the monthly revenue
allocations to each local government council. The variable Elected indicates whether a local government council is elected or appointed in a given month. Panel (A) reports results for an annual resolution
of the data, Panel (B) for a quarter yearly resolution, and Panel (C) for a monthly resolution. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the LGA level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A16: Effect of Resource rents on civil conflict: Alternative functional forms to ac-
count for count data
Type of Event Groups involved Between pol militias &...
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Overall Battle Civilian Violence Protest Military Pol Militia Comm militia Rebels Military Civilians
Panel A: OLS
LGC Allocations 0.853*** 0.220*** 0.343*** 0.134** 0.266*** 0.530*** 0.111*** 0.011 0.193*** 0.290***
(0.211) (0.068) (0.079) (0.066) (0.072) (0.156) (0.041) (0.010) (0.060) (0.087)
Elected x LGC Allocations -0.147* -0.075*** -0.093*** 0.043 -0.075** -0.207*** 0.010 -0.002 -0.086*** -0.108***
(0.076) (0.027) (0.030) (0.033) (0.030) (0.058) (0.014) (0.003) (0.026) (0.031)
Observations 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369 12369
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .516 .153 .189 .0968 .149 .262 .0875 .0145 .0868 .142
Panel B: Poisson
LGC Allocations 0.430** 0.459 0.601** 0.153 0.312 0.568* 0.382 1.005** 0.459 0.597*
(0.208) (0.285) (0.296) (0.186) (0.253) (0.319) (0.406) (0.499) (0.434) (0.353)
Elected x LGC Allocations -0.071 -0.129 -0.152 0.010 -0.129 -0.211** 0.119 0.105 -0.224 -0.218**
(0.081) (0.108) (0.100) (0.073) (0.110) (0.101) (0.135) (0.263) (0.143) (0.109)
Observations 8257 5498 6215 2726 4999 6452 4234 552 3578 5143
Number of LGCs 517 344 389 195 313 404 265 46 224 322
Mean of DV .773 .344 .376 .439 .368 .501 .256 .324 .3 .342
Panel C: NB
LGC Allocations 0.160** 0.176* 0.320*** 0.263 0.229** 0.207** 0.116 0.629 0.260* 0.314***
(0.066) (0.095) (0.097) (0.173) (0.103) (0.086) (0.117) (0.506) (0.141) (0.119)
Elected x LGC Allocations -0.062 -0.038 -0.102* 0.051 -0.115* -0.089 0.043 0.009 -0.165* -0.139**
(0.043) (0.064) (0.058) (0.082) (0.066) (0.054) (0.087) (0.256) (0.088) (0.066)
Observations 8257 5498 6215 3114 4999 6452 4234 736 3578 5143
Number of LGCs 517 344 389 195 313 404 265 46 224 322
Mean of DV .773 .344 .376 .384 .368 .501 .256 .243 .3 .342
Notes: Table presents regression results documenting that the main results are robust to alternative functional forms. All regressions control for local
government area (LGA) and time fixed effects fixed effects. The dependent variables throughout are the count number of events per LGA and year for
the period covering 1999-2014. The dependent variable includes the count number of (1) violent conflict events defined as the use of force by a group
with a political purpose. Type of events include (2) battles defined as violent interactions between two politically organized armed groups; (3) violence
involving civilians are violent acts by an organized political group against unarmed non-combatants; (4) protests are demonstrations and spontaneous
acts of violence by disorganised groups. Columns (5)–(8) include the specific groups involved; (6) political militias are armed agents to influence political
processes; (7) communal militias are (ethnic or religious) groups engaged in local political competition; (8) rebels are political organizations to counter
an established national government. Columns (9)–(10) present results for the specific dyadic interaction of actors involved. The variable LGC Allocations
captures the monthly revenue allocations to each local government council. The variable Elected indicates whether a local government council is elected
or appointed in a given month. Panel (B) employs a Poisson estimation, and Panel (C) a negative-binomial estimation. Standard errors in parentheses
are adjusted for clustering at the LGA level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A17: Robustness: Controlling flexibly for formula inputs
Type of Event Groups involved Between Pol. Militias &...
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Overall Battle Civilian Violence Protest Military Pol. Militia Comm. Militia Rebels Military Civilians
Panel A: Population Weight Decile x Time FE
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.096 0.117* 0.117* -0.076* 0.097* 0.160** 0.022 -0.012 0.115** 0.134**
(0.095) (0.065) (0.060) (0.043) (0.056) (0.080) (0.033) (0.010) (0.053) (0.061)
Elected × LGC Statutory Allocations -0.100 -0.086 -0.075 0.006 -0.090* -0.131* -0.031 0.030** -0.094* -0.116**
(0.082) (0.059) (0.060) (0.031) (0.051) (0.071) (0.025) (0.013) (0.048) (0.055)
Observations 140629 140629 140629 140629 140629 140629 140629 140629 140629 140629
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .0238 .00906 .0112 .00504 .0084 .0133 .00491 .000981 .00487 .00828
Panel B: Landmass Weight Decile x Time FE
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.184*** 0.079** 0.113*** 0.019 0.098*** 0.149*** 0.044** -0.014* 0.062** 0.118***
(0.051) (0.036) (0.040) (0.024) (0.029) (0.043) (0.022) (0.008) (0.027) (0.037)
Elected × LGC Statutory Allocations -0.111** -0.061 -0.065 -0.007 -0.064* -0.100** -0.042** 0.029** -0.057* -0.094**
(0.056) (0.041) (0.042) (0.027) (0.033) (0.046) (0.019) (0.012) (0.031) (0.038)
Observations 140629 140629 140629 140629 140629 140629 140629 140629 140629 140629
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .0238 .00906 .0112 .00504 .0084 .0133 .00491 .000981 .00487 .00828
Panel C: Public Good Access Index Deciles x Time FE
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.197*** 0.109** 0.102** 0.018 0.111*** 0.166*** 0.052* -0.014 0.089** 0.112**
(0.069) (0.049) (0.048) (0.025) (0.038) (0.060) (0.026) (0.009) (0.036) (0.047)
Elected × LGC Statutory Allocations -0.125* -0.083* -0.050 -0.012 -0.080** -0.112* -0.044* 0.028** -0.076** -0.086*
(0.070) (0.048) (0.049) (0.028) (0.039) (0.058) (0.023) (0.011) (0.037) (0.045)
Observations 140629 140629 140629 140629 140629 140629 140629 140629 140629 140629
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .0238 .00906 .0112 .00504 .0084 .0133 .00491 .000981 .00487 .00828
Panel D: Water supply spread Index Deciles x Time FE
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.184*** 0.079** 0.113*** 0.019 0.098*** 0.149*** 0.044** -0.014* 0.062** 0.118***
(0.051) (0.036) (0.040) (0.024) (0.029) (0.043) (0.022) (0.008) (0.027) (0.037)
Elected × LGC Statutory Allocations -0.111** -0.061 -0.065 -0.007 -0.064* -0.100** -0.042** 0.029** -0.057* -0.094**
(0.056) (0.041) (0.042) (0.027) (0.033) (0.046) (0.019) (0.012) (0.031) (0.038)
Observations 140629 140629 140629 140629 140629 140629 140629 140629 140629 140629
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .0238 .00906 .0112 .00504 .0084 .0133 .00491 .000981 .00487 .00828
Panel E: Hospital beds Index Deciles x Time FE
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.206*** 0.114** 0.139*** 0.007 0.118*** 0.180*** 0.055** -0.010 0.095** 0.134**
(0.071) (0.054) (0.051) (0.022) (0.044) (0.064) (0.025) (0.007) (0.043) (0.051)
Elected × LGC Statutory Allocations -0.131* -0.080 -0.087* -0.005 -0.084* -0.128** -0.045** 0.026** -0.081* -0.113**
(0.067) (0.052) (0.051) (0.023) (0.043) (0.061) (0.021) (0.010) (0.041) (0.049)
Observations 140629 140629 140629 140629 140629 140629 140629 140629 140629 140629
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .0238 .00906 .0112 .00504 .0084 .0133 .00491 .000981 .00487 .00828
Notes: Table presents regression results documenting that the results are robust to flexibly controlling for different inputs into the revenue sharing formula by controlling for non-linear time effects in the deciles of
the different weight subcomponents. All regressions control local government area (LGA) by elected status and state by time fixed effects. The dependent variable includes (1) any violent conflict event defined as the
use of force by a group with a political purpose. Type of events include (2) battles defined as violent interactions between two politically organized armed groups; (3) violence involving civilians are violent acts by an
organized political group against unarmed non-combatants; (4) protests are demonstrations and spontaneous acts of violence by disorganised groups. Columns (5)–(8) include the specific groups involved; (6) political
militias are armed agents to influence political processes; (7) communal militias are (ethnic or religious) groups engaged in local political competition; (8) rebels are political organizations to counter an established
national government. Columns (9)–(10) present results for the specific dyadic interaction of actors involved. The variable LGC Allocations captures the monthly revenue allocations to each local government council. The
variable Elected indicates whether a local government council is elected or appointed in a given month. Panels (A)–(E) control flexibly for the various allocation formula sub-indices defined by the Federation Account
Allocation Committee. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for two way clustering by LGA and time level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A18: Validation of measure of exclusion of ethnic groups
Alignment with ethnic group of state governor
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Own ethnic group treated unfairly (dummy)
Person not aligned with governor’s ethnicity 0.046*** 0.034** 0.042*** 0.026*
(0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015)
Observations 15980 15980 15978 15978
Number of LGCs 579 579 577 577
Mean of DV .803 .803 .803 .803
Panel B: Own ethnic group treated unfairly
Person not aligned with governor’s ethnicity 0.117*** 0.086*** 0.085*** 0.045
(0.029) (0.033) (0.032) (0.038)
Observations 15980 15980 15978 15978
Number of LGCs 579 579 577 577
Mean of DV 3.32 3.32 3.32 3.32
State FE X X
LGA FE X X
Time FE X X
Notes: The explanatory variable measures whether a respondent perceives the own ethnic group treated unfairly on a 4-
point likert scale (Panel A), or at least sometimes (Panel B) to be treated unfairly by the government. The dependent variable
indicates whether a respondent is of the same ethnic group as the state governor. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered
by LGA level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A19: LGA Allocations and Grievances towards National Political Institutions
Approval of MP National MP’s are corrupt Trust in National Assembly
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: 6 months
LGC Allocations 6 months prior to survey -0.163 -0.161 0.067 0.040 -0.169 -0.162
(0.117) (0.112) (0.135) (0.135) (0.118) (0.128)
Elected × LGC Allocations 6 months prior to survey 0.044 0.042 0.115 0.128 0.033 0.034
(0.100) (0.095) (0.101) (0.101) (0.087) (0.090)
Observations 12624 11237 8993 8868 12943 11495
Number of LGCs 575 574 522 522 573 572
Mean of DV 2.83 2.9 3.73 3.73 2.51 2.59
Panel B: 12 months
LGC Allocations 12 months prior to survey -0.080 -0.077 0.023 0.008 -0.081 -0.078
(0.057) (0.055) (0.066) (0.066) (0.057) (0.060)
Elected × LGC Allocations 12 months prior to survey 0.026 0.024 0.048 0.055 0.017 0.018
(0.047) (0.045) (0.048) (0.047) (0.041) (0.042)
Observations 12624 11237 8993 8868 12943 11495
Number of LGCs 575 574 522 522 573 572
Mean of DV 2.83 2.9 3.73 3.73 2.51 2.59
Panel C: 18 months
LGC Allocations 18 months prior to survey -0.059 -0.055 0.020 0.011 -0.058 -0.055
(0.038) (0.036) (0.046) (0.045) (0.040) (0.041)
Elected × LGC Allocations 18 months prior to survey 0.021 0.019 0.027 0.031 0.015 0.015
(0.031) (0.029) (0.032) (0.032) (0.028) (0.029)
Observations 12624 11237 8993 8868 12943 11495
Number of LGCs 575 574 522 522 573 572
Mean of DV 2.83 2.9 3.73 3.73 2.51 2.59
Respondent controls X X X
Notes: All regressions control for time fixed effects and local government area (LGA) fixed effects. The dependent variable in columns (1)–(2) indicates how
much a respondent approves of the performance of the Members of Parliament at the federal government level; in columns (3)–(4) it captures perception of
corruption of Members of Parliament; columns (5)–(6) indicates how much a respondent trusts the National Assembly. The variable Elected indicates whether
a local government council is elected or appointed in a given month. Respondent controls include the respondents age, educational attainment, employment
status, gender and an indicator whether the household lives in an urban area. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by LGA level with stars indicating
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A20: LGA Allocations and Grievances towards State level Political institutions
Approval State Governor State Assembly corrupt Trust State governor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: 6 months
LGC Allocations 6 months prior to survey -0.660* -0.235 1.613 1.393 -0.292 -0.316
(0.400) (0.373) (1.600) (1.549) (0.271) (0.303)
Elected × LGC Allocations 6 months prior to survey 0.120 -0.074 0.170 0.081 0.126 0.174
(0.311) (0.271) (1.746) (1.720) (0.226) (0.259)
Observations 4327 3596 2340 2301 6537 5157
Number of LGCs 309 309 198 198 359 358
Mean of DV 2.82 2.92 3.68 3.68 2.39 2.48
Panel B: 12 months
LGC Allocations 12 months prior to survey -0.288 -0.090 -0.841 -0.678 -0.119 -0.130
(0.190) (0.176) (2.328) (2.526) (0.123) (0.139)
Elected × LGC Allocations 12 months prior to survey 0.044 -0.042 0.644 0.516 0.048 0.071
(0.145) (0.127) (0.973) (1.003) (0.103) (0.119)
Observations 4327 3596 2340 2301 6537 5157
Number of LGCs 309 309 198 198 359 358
Mean of DV 2.82 2.92 3.68 3.68 2.39 2.48
Panel C: 18 months
LGC Allocations 18 months prior to survey -0.195 -0.073 1.447 1.202 -0.090 -0.097
(0.122) (0.111) (1.008) (0.983) (0.080) (0.089)
Elected × LGC Allocations 18 months prior to survey 0.027 -0.026 0.312 0.290 0.044 0.059
(0.094) (0.081) (0.606) (0.607) (0.066) (0.076)
Observations 4327 3596 2340 2301 6537 5157
Number of LGCs 309 309 198 198 359 358
Mean of DV 2.82 2.92 3.68 3.68 2.39 2.48
Respondent controls X X X
Notes: All regressions control for time fixed effects and local government area (LGA) fixed effects. The dependent variable in columns (1)–(2) indicates how
much a respondent approves of the performance of the State Governor; in columns (3)–(4) it captures perception of corruption among members of the State
assembly; columns (5)–(6) indicates how much a respondent trust the state governor. The variable Elected indicates whether a local government council is
elected or appointed in a given month. Respondent controls include the respondents age, educational attainment, employment status, gender and an indicator
whether the household lives in an urban area. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by LGA level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1.
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Table A21: Continuous measure of non-aligned ethnic group share - Inclusion of Ethnic Groups Through Elections and
Conflict: Estimation of effect on conflict levels
Type of Event Groups involved Between Pol. Militias &...
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Overall Battle Civilian Violence Protest Military Pol. Militia Comm. Militia Rebels Military Civilians
Panel A: Level effect
Elected -0.007** -0.004** -0.006*** 0.001 -0.004** -0.009*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.005*** -0.007***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 148428 148428 148428 148428 148428 148428 148428 148428 148428 148428
Number of LGCs 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean of DV .0251 .0093 .0116 .00566 .0087 .0137 .00519 .000936 .00509 .00862
Panel B: Ethnic alignment heterogenous effect
Elected -0.007** -0.004** -0.006*** 0.002 -0.005** -0.009*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.006*** -0.007***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Elected × Non-aligned ethnic group -0.015*** -0.005* -0.011*** -0.003** -0.007** -0.012*** -0.004** 0.002** -0.006** -0.011***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Non-aligned ethnic group 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.005 -0.001 -0.000 0.003 0.005
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 131107 131107 131107 131107 131107 131107 131107 131107 131107 131107
Number of LGCs 706 706 706 706 706 706 706 706 706 706
Mean of DV .0257 .00959 .0121 .00551 .00864 .0141 .00542 .00103 .00507 .00901
Notes: All regressions control for local government area (LGA) fixed effects and time fixed effects. The dependent variable includes (1) any violent conflict event defined as the use of force by a group
with a political purpose. Type of events include (2) battles defined as violent interactions between two politically organized armed groups; (3) violence involving civilians are violent acts by an organized
political group against unarmed non-combatants; (4) protests are demonstrations and spontaneous acts of violence by disorganised groups. Columns (5)–(8) include the specific groups involved; (6)
political militias are armed agents to influence political processes; (7) communal militias are (ethnic or religious) groups engaged in local political competition; (8) rebels are political organizations
to counter an established national government. Columns (9)–(10) present results for the specific dyadic interaction of actors involved. The main explanatory variable Elected indicates whether a local
government council is elected or appointed in a given month. The variable Non-aligned ethnic group measures the population share that is of a different ethnic group than the state governor. Standard
errors in parentheses are adjusted for two way clustering by LGA and time with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A22: Continuous measure of non-aligned ethnic group share - Inclusion of Ethnic Groups Through Elections and
Conflict: Triple Difference-in-Differences with Allocated Rents
Type of Event Groups involved Between Pol. Militias &...
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Overall Battle Civilian Violence Protest Military Pol. Militia Comm. Militia Rebels Military Civilians
Panel A: Appointed local governments
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.336*** 0.150*** 0.222*** 0.010 0.156*** 0.310*** 0.077*** -0.002 0.140*** 0.214***
(0.093) (0.054) (0.062) (0.037) (0.052) (0.081) (0.028) (0.007) (0.046) (0.066)
Non-aligned ethnic group × LGC Statutory Allocations 0.138*** 0.059** 0.118*** -0.003 0.083*** 0.128*** 0.033*** -0.006 0.071*** 0.104***
(0.041) (0.024) (0.030) (0.018) (0.025) (0.035) (0.012) (0.004) (0.023) (0.028)
Observations 45789 45789 45789 45789 45789 45789 45789 45789 45789 45789
Number of LGCs 706 706 706 706 706 706 706 706 706 706
Mean of DV .0303 .0117 .016 .00467 .0112 .02 .00524 .0012 .00795 .0133
Panel B: including interaction terms
LGC Statutory Allocations 0.263*** 0.108*** 0.168*** 0.029 0.122*** 0.213*** 0.044* 0.007 0.095*** 0.145***
(0.068) (0.035) (0.040) (0.024) (0.033) (0.053) (0.024) (0.005) (0.027) (0.040)
Elected × LGC Statutory Allocations -0.076** -0.058*** -0.064*** 0.021 -0.044** -0.119*** 0.005 0.003 -0.059*** -0.088***
(0.032) (0.020) (0.021) (0.016) (0.020) (0.028) (0.011) (0.005) (0.018) (0.022)
Non-aligned ethnic group × LGC Statutory Allocations 0.149*** 0.064** 0.126*** -0.003 0.088*** 0.139*** 0.036*** -0.006 0.076*** 0.112***
(0.041) (0.025) (0.031) (0.018) (0.025) (0.036) (0.012) (0.004) (0.024) (0.029)
Elected × Non-aligned ethnic group × LGC Statutory Allocations -0.174*** -0.060** -0.122*** -0.035 -0.078*** -0.118*** -0.050*** 0.005 -0.062*** -0.092***
(0.047) (0.028) (0.032) (0.024) (0.028) (0.036) (0.017) (0.006) (0.024) (0.029)
Observations 127130 127130 127130 127130 127130 127130 127130 127130 127130 127130
Number of LGCs 706 706 706 706 706 706 706 706 706 706
Mean of DV .0243 .00934 .0115 .00491 .00836 .0135 .00515 .00106 .00485 .00857
Notes: All regressions control for local government area (LGA) by election status fixed effects and time fixed effects. Panel A is estimated off the sample with appointed local governments and includes LGA fixed effects, while Panel
B includes the periods with elected local governments and a separate set of LGA fixed effects for periods in which governments are elected. The dependent variable includes (1) any violent conflict event defined as the use of force
by a group with a political purpose. Type of events include (2) battles defined as violent interactions between two politically organized armed groups; (3) violence involving civilians are violent acts by an organized political group
against unarmed non-combatants; (4) protests are demonstrations and spontaneous acts of violence by disorganised groups. Columns (5)–(8) include the specific groups involved; (6) political militias are armed agents to influence political
processes; (7) communal militias are (ethnic or religious) groups engaged in local political competition; (8) rebels are political organizations to counter an established national government. Columns (9)–(10) present results for the specific
dyadic interaction of actors involved. The variable Elected indicates whether a local government council is elected or appointed in a given month. The variable Non-aligned ethnic group measures the population share that is of a different
ethnic group than the state governor. LGC Allocations captures the monthly revenue allocation to a local government council. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for two way clustering by LGA and time with stars indicating ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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B Extended Discussion of Institutional Background and Con-
text
In this appendix B, we provide further details on the institutional situation and rel-
evant context related topics. First, we explain what the main characteristics of Nigerian
fiscal federalism are and how local and state governments are mainly funded by oil rev-
enues (section B.1). Relatedly, in section B.2 we describe incidences of withholding of
revenue allocations and provide further documentation on the robustness of our results.
Section B.3 provides further evidence and examples of the contest for institutionalized
rents. In section B.4 we present a detailed case study of the Boko Haram sect and why it
fits well with the framework of the logic of political violence (Besley and Persson, 2011).
Finally, we describe some additional context on the local government elections (B.5).
B.1 Fiscal federalism, oil revenues and local government finance
Nigeria exhibits a system of fiscal federalism with rules defined in the Nigerian Con-
stitution (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999). The largest part of tax revenues are paid
into a centrally managed Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation, the Federation
Account. This federation account is mostly alimented from tax revenue on oil and value-
added tax (VAT). Oil tax revenues comprise a major part of overall tax revenues, and
are fundamental for public finances at all government levels; e.g. in the year 2013, they
amounted to 75% of budgetary revenues (World Bank, 2013). The centrally collected tax
revenues are then allocated to the 3 tiers of government, the federal government, the
states and the local government councils according to a specific allocation formula by
the Federation Account Allocation Committee (FAAC) under the auspices of the Rev-
enue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission according to the Constitution of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999).1
Under the 1999 constitution, at least 13% percent of oil revenues must directly flow
back to the oil-producing states to account for their status as the source of revenues. This
rule is known as the derivation principle (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999).2 Subse-
1The Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission is comprised of a chairman and one
member from each state and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. The Federation Account Allocation
Committee is constituted of the Federal Minister of Finance, representatives of each state (usually the states’
commissioners of Finance and their accountants-general), and representatives from fiscal and monetary
related federal agencies such as the Central Bank, and the Customs and Federal Inland Revenue Services
(Maystadt and Salihu, 2015).
2The states benefiting from the derivation principle are Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta,
Edo, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers. Anambra recently also became an oil producing state, yet they haven’t
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quently, the collected tax revenues are divided by a vertical and horizontal allocation for-
mula. The vertical allocation formula states that 52.68 percent of revenue allocations are
disbursed to the federal government, 26.72 percent to the state governments and the FCT
(Abuja), and 20.60 percent to the local governments. The share of revenues that accrues to
the state and local government councils, is then further divided according to a horizontal
allocation formula that makes allowance for geographic and socio-economic characteris-
tics of the respective administrative unit. These geographic and socio-economic indicators
of the formula are (i) equality 40%; (ii) population 30%; (iii) internal revenue generation
Effort 10%; (iv) landmass and terrain 10%; (v) education 4%; (vi) health 3% (primary
school enrolment); (vii) water supply 3% (rainfall).3 Panel (A) in Figure 2 presents a map
representing the revenue allocation index weight for each of the 774 local government
areas. Table A1 presents descriptive statistics for the various demographic and socio-
economic characteristics comprising the allocation index weights calculated for each local
government by the FAAC. Population and landmass are by far the most important factors
when it comes to explaining the cross sectional variation in the overall index. On the
other hand, factors such as Equality, Terrain and Rainfall share do not vary across the
country.
Data on monthly allocations and the index weights are published by the FAAC of
the Federal Ministry of Finance. We assemble the monthly allocation data to a balanced
panel including all 774 local government areas for the period June 1999 to July 2014.4 The
information on the monthly allocations is communicated by the Accountant-General of
the Federation in Abuja each month.
Oil revenues that aliment the Federation Account depend both on the price of crude
oil and the magnitude of oil production. We hence obtain data on the crude oil price
from Thomson Reuters5 and monthly oil product data from Nigerian National Petroleum
Corporation. The relevant variable to drive the variation behind changes in monthly
benefited from the derivation principle during our study period.
3The landmass and terrain factor is further equally divided into one constant part for all local gov-
ernment areas according to terrain conditions in the state (50% of 10%), and a second part measuring the
size of the landmass of each local government area (50% of 10%). The internal revenue generation effort
is further divided into one part applying to each local government council in each state equally (75% of
10%), and one part depending on the individual revenue effort of each local government council (25% of
10%). The water supply factor is further equally divided into an equality part applying to all local govern-
ment councils equally in each state (50% of 3%), and territorial spread of rainfall depending on each local
government area’s rainfall (50% of 3%).
4The data was available on www.faac.gov.ng in April 2015. The website is currently not online (August
2017).
5We use the Brent Crude Oil Price extracted from Thomson Reuters Datastream.
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allocations to local government areas appears to be the oil price, and not the production
quantity. Table A4 in the appendix highlights that the amount of variation in the monthly
levels of oil production is significantly smaller compared to the variation in monthly oil
prices. Monthly Nigerian crude oil production varies around a mean of 2.32 million
barrels with a standard deviation of 0.17 million barrels, while monthly oil prices vary
around a mean monthly price of USD 64.21 with a standard deviation of USD 34.97,
suggesting that the bulk of the variation in allocations is due to price variation. This
is relevant to the extent that prevailing world oil prices are unaffected by Nigerian oil
production.
In our empirical analysis, we investigate whether oil producing states are affected
differently by violence compared to non-oil states. We hence collect data on the location
of oil and gas fields from the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) across
Nigeria. We construct a dummy that is equal to 1 in case a local government area is
intersecting an oil field. This measure includes not only producing oil fields, but also
fields that are under exploration. In total 63 local government areas do have an oil or gas
field. Additionally, we also create an indicator variable to mark states as oil producing. As
discussed in the paper, Appendix Table A3 demonstrates that violence in oil-producing
areas – as in the rest of the country – appears to be driven by the statutory allocations to
the local government councils.
Statutory and extraordinary allocations Federal allocations of oil revenues can be roughly
divided into two categories of disbursements. Statutory allocations are calculated based on
a benchmark price of oil determined at the beginning of each year and are regularly dis-
bursed each month. Extraordinary allocations are disbursed irregularly and are based on
idiosyncratic political decisions. Such augmented allocations originate from the Excess
Crude Account (ECA). The ECA was established 2004 in order to collect resource revenues
that accrue due to the difference between the yearly benchmark oil price and the actual
market price. Its objective was to account for the volatility in crude oil prices to protect
planned budgets (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2012). Essentially, it was set up as a “rainy day
fund”.6
The ECA was surrounded by controversies throughout its existence (Central Bank of
Nigeria, 2012). It was subject to the whims of political leaders, which raised serious
6In 2010, Nigeria’s National Economic Council approved the creation of a national sovereign wealth
fund to replace the Excess Crude Account. The establishment of the Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority
was signed into law on 25 May, 2011 (Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority, 2015). The wealth fund
operates three separate funds, the Stabilisation Fund (SF), the Future Generations Fund (FGF), and the
Nigeria Infrastructure Fund (NIF).
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concerns about transparency and accountability. It was meant to de-link government
expenditure from oil revenues in order to insulate the Nigerian economy from external
shocks. Due to surging oil prices, the funds collected in the ECA increased almost fourfold
from $ 5.1 billion to over $ 20 billion by November 2008. Due to budget deficits at all
government level as a consequence of the financial crisis and falling oil prices, the ECA
decreased to less than $ 4 billion in 2010. The augmentation payments to the three tiers of
government from the ECA are rather unexpected as they are due to unexpected changes
in oil prices.
A large part of accumulated funds was depleted in the year 2009, when in February
the state governors asked for the sharing of $ 4 billion from the account. The newspa-
per Leadership reported that the Conference of Nigerian Political Parties (CNPP) to make
public the actual use of $ 130 billion accruing to the ECA since 2000.
In the year 2009, there was a $ 2 billion stimulus package paid out to the three tiers
of government. The federal government received $842, the 36 states received $ 799.648
million while the 774 local government councils got the balance of $ 358.4 million. The
state with the largest amount paid out was Rivers with $ 108.7 million, while the state
with the smallest amount received was Ebonyi with $ 10.4 million (Daily Trust, 19 October
2009). Vanguard (2 April, 2009) reports that President Yar Adua succumbed to the pressure
of state governors to deplete the ECA. So it became a additional source of extra money
for the three tiers of government.
Local government responsibilities According to the constitution (Federal Republic of
Nigeria, 1999), economic planning and development is in joint responsibility of state and
local government councils. The constitution instructs local governments to form an eco-
nomic planning board. While the local governments appear to be a tier of government that
are an executing body for the state governments, they have indeed substantial autonomy.
Most important, they are responsible to provide primary education and primary health
care services.7 Local governments should build and maintain the physical infrastructure
of primary health centres, payment of all staff salaries and ensuring the centres sufficient
stock of medicines and other resources. With regard to education, local governments bear
7According to Khemani (2006), the real responsibility of providing education and health care services
is indeed delegated to local governments, although the constitution puts the task in the joint responsibility
of state and local governments. An informative account of how local government are de-facto responsible
for providing education and health care services is given in (Albin-Lackey, 2007), in 5 case studies of local
governments (Etche, Khana, Tai, Akuku/Toru, and Obio/Akpor). A World Bank report describes in an
insightful way how local governments can outperform other local government areas if the local government
council is active and willing to implement progressive policies (see World Bank, 2002, p. 46).
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the responsibility to execute government education policies and to run primary schools on
a daily basis (for further details see Albin-Lackey, 2007). Further responsibilities include
such diverse tasks as the provision of adult and vocational education, and the develop-
ment of agriculture and natural resources (other than the exploitation).8 Overall, the local
governments play a prominent role in providing public goods that are important in the
citizens everyday life. The absence of a functioning local government may thus create
grievances among the local population and lower its trust in institutions.
Local government finance management With the transition to democratic rule in 1999,
the Nigerian fiscal system was decentralized rapidly. According to a World Bank report,
the share of sub-national budget spending in the consolidated budget increased from 23%
in 1999 to 46% in 2005 (World Bank, 2007). The sub-national budget expenditure already
was almost four times higher in 2005 than in 1999 in real terms, while the expenditure at
the local level in fact grew even faster than at the state level, so that sub-national budget
systems have become more decentralized. This followed a stricter implementation of
federal allocations than in the 1990s.
The bulk of gross revenues at local level originate from disbursements out of the
federation account. Local governments can raise internally generated revenues as well.
Their ability and the extent to which they do, however, is very limited. Overall they raised
less than 5% of gross revenues through internally generated means in the period 2001–
2005 (Eboh et al., 2006). This is not surprising as tax powers available to local governments
are limited to minor subjects, such as property tax and market and trading licences.9 As
local governments hence heavily depend on the allocations of resource revenues from the
Federation Account, which heavily fluctuate with global oil prices, their fiscal situation is
highly volatile and unsustainable (World Bank, 2013).
Various reports and newspaper articles describe the mismanagement of public fi-
nances at the local level. Human Rights Watch (HRM, 2007) conducted a detailed analysis
of local government finances in a number of local government areas in Rivers State, which
apparently is a difficult task as local government councils treat the budgets and financial
reports as closely guarded secrets. HRM specifically investigated how local finances are
managed, focusing on expenditures for education and health care (Albin-Lackey, 2007).
8The local government council further makes recommendations to the State commission on economic
planning on diverse issues such as the construction and maintenance of roads, streets, street lightings,
drains, the provision and maintenance of public conveniences, sewage and refuse disposal, the control and
regulation of shops, kiosks, restaurants, bakeries, and other places for the sale of food, and the licensing,
regulation, and control of the sale of liquor (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999).
9A full list of tax powers is provided in Ekpo and Englama (2008).
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By Rivers State law, the legislative body in each local government is to approve or
vote down annual budgets presented by the chairperson of the LGC. Legislative councils
are also entitled to review the end-of-year expenditure reports that are submitted by the
chair. This check on the chairperson’s handling of local budgets – although theoretically
important – ended up being an opportunity for local councils members to ask for bribes,
as a device for self-enrichment, in return for passing the budget. Many local councillors
see the budget process as the best opportunity to claim their share of the allocated rev-
enues. Once the councillors got their requested share of the pie, the chairmen are left free
and unconstrained to spend the remaining allocations according to their preferences and
not accounted in the budget process (Albin-Lackey, 2007).
Substantial revenues are declared in the local budget process for projects that are never
properly implemented or are even non-existent. One local government chairman in Rivers
State spent huge sums on e.g. a “demonstration fish pond” that was never operational
and payment of more than 100 “functional committee/protocol officers” whose respon-
sibilities were entirely unclear (Albin-Lackey, 2007). According to the newspaper Daily
Champion, in Oshimili local government area, N 2 million were apparently spent on ero-
sion control, yet there was no visible sign of such a project. Another example of very poor
budget implementation is Warri South local government, where millions of Naira have
been allocated to landscaping the chairman’s house, construction/renovation of market
stalls, the purchase of generator transformers, the provision of a solar water scheme, the
construction of drains/culverts, the maintenance of parks and gardens, the construction
of motor parks in selected towns, and the construction of television viewing centres. Yet,
none of these projects were actually implemented.10 These examples of the local public
finance management provide both an insight into the variety of projects that are budgeted
and the poor implementation in many cases. Although these are just examples, they rep-
resent larger inefficiencies of public finance management at the local level, as described
in detail in (Albin-Lackey, 2007).
The failure to pay salaries, is another example of the poor public finance management
at the local level (Albin-Lackey, 2007, p. 13). It is reported that in LGCs in Rivers State,
salaries for public sector workers are routinely withheld while the funds that were set
aside to pay them disappear. In other local governments, it is alleged that non-existent
workers are on the payroll of local governments, which is another way for local politicians
to siphon away public funds (Albin-Lackey, 2007, p. 34).
10These accounts of poor public finance management can be in found in the newspaper The Daily Cham-
pion, 22 June, 2007.
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While citizens at the local level observe that local government council members enrich
themselves, the provision of health care and education is miserable. According to a civil
society organization in Port Harcourt11, the local government chairs have no objectives
other than getting paid to do nothing. Except for paying salaries, the local governments
have ceased to perform any duties assigned to them. Some local government chairmen
apparently do not even reside in their local governments, but only come back to pay out
salaries and to distribute the remainder of the monthly allocations as patronage. While
there are few positive accounts of local finance management, the overall assessment is
usually rather devastating. An official of the Federal Economic and Financial Crimes
Commission stated: “To say that [local government] everywhere is a disaster is not a
fair assessment, but it is not far from the truth.” (Albin-Lackey, 2007, p.25). A positive
example in the use of increased local public finances is Tai LGC. According to HRM,
Tai LGC used the allocated revenues to implement numerous projects such as renovating
schools, building new classroom blocks, and constructed 7 new health care centres. The
Tai LGC compiled a list of all projects undertaken and also made it public. Many of the
projects were undertaken at the request of the communities within the local government
(Albin-Lackey, 2007, p.27).
It becomes clear that local governments public finance management is poor, yet dif-
fers in capacity across LGAs. Because of the high volatility in oil prices, the flow of
allocations into local accounts is both hard to predict and opens the floodgates to misap-
propriate public funds. This brings us back to the main variation we use in our empirical
framework. As mentioned above and shown in Table A2, the within-LGA variation in al-
locations is considerable and driven by global oil prices (see Table A4). This high volatil-
ity makes the processes in public finance management, such as paying public servants’
salaries or providing public goods, difficult and non-transparent and calls for strong po-
litical factions to appropriate its share, using force if necessary.
B.2 Withholding of local government allocations
The withholding of revenue allocations by the federal or state governments was re-
ported related to the creation of new local government areas and emergency rules. This
could potentially affect our empirical results. We have collected additional data to detect
episodes when allocations were alleged to have been withheld. Furthermore, we also
discuss and identify periods when state governments might have deducted parts of the
allocations to fund joint state-local government projects. The provided additional empiri-
11Port Harcourt is the capital and largest city in Rivers State.
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cal exercises demonstrate that neither the withholding of allocations nor deductions alter
our findings.
Legally there is very limited basis for the government to withhold allocations as the
sharing of revenues is set in the country’s 1999 constitution. Every episode of alleged
withholding allocations led to strong altercations in the National Assembly over its con-
stitutionality, and both local and state governments were fighting the withholding of
allocations at the Nigerian Supreme Court, which tried to enforce the constitution and
typically sided with the local councils.
Withholding does not imply forfeit of legal claims Our understanding is that the tem-
porary withholding, however, does not imply that the LGAs have no legal claim to the
allocations, but rather, it simply implied a defer of the cash flow implying that the con-
test logic should still hold as the value of the liabilities remains. This is an important
conceptual point as direct or indirect control over the potential asset is what matters.
Nevertheless, there have been a few cases in which, during narrow time periods, the
allocations may have been temporarily withheld. We further elaborate how we identified
these cases through a thorough media content analysis and we show that the results
presented here are robust. We have identified two main cases in which allocations to local
governments may have been temporarily withheld:
Creation of new local government areas Due to the structure of the revenue shar-
ing formula, which implies a minimum fixed share of revenues for each LGA, there exist
incentives for new LGAs to be created. There have been instances in which LGAs at-
tempted to split or states attempted to create new LGAs. While this is legally possible, it
requires approval of the federal government (which de jure never happened since 1999).
Ebonyi state was the first to create 21 new local governments in April 2002. While the
Abakaliki High Court and the National Assembly rejected the new local governments as
illegal, funds were withheld only in April 2002. The state government backtracked and
funds were released.12
Two years later, in April 2004, the allocations to the states of Ebonyi, Lagos, Nasarawa,
Niger and Katsina were withheld by President Obasanjo also upon the creation of new
local government areas in these states. Pressure mounted on these states to dissolve
the new LGAs, and all of them backtracked few months later in July 2004, except for
Lagos. Lagos Governor Tinubu did not abandon the idea of following through with the
creation of the new local government areas. The conflict between President Obasanjo
12All newspaper articles and sources are available on request.
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and Governor Tinubu turned into a 3-year long legal and political battle between the
federal and the state government. In December 2004, the Supreme Court ruled that it
was illegal for the federal government to withhold any allocations accruing to the local
governments. However, the court also decided that the newly created local governments
would only become operational once they were confirmed by the National Assembly and
subsequently listed in the constitution. Despite the ruling and the order to immediately
release the funds, the situation remained unresolved. The newly created LGAs were
renamed as “council development areas” in 2005, and consequently around 20 billion
Naira were released. Yet, only the general election in 2007 that resulted in both Tinubu
and Obasanjo leaving office allowed to fully resolve the dispute, and the funds (around
10 billion Naira) were released by the incoming President Yar’Adua.
Emergency rule The second important case, that led to the withholding of alloca-
tions, was the declaration of an emergency rule either in a state or certain local govern-
ment areas in some instances. There were a number of emergency rules declared, yet not
always had allocations been withheld.
The insurgency of the Boko Haram sect led the federal government to declare state of
emergencies during the years 2011–2014. A state of emergency was declared in a subset
of LGA’s across the states of Borno, Niger, Plateau, and Yobe in January 2012 (declared
on 31 December 2011). The state of emergency in these LGAs lasted until June 2012
(six months). Since the Boko Haram insurgency couldn’t be brought under control, the
federal government issued another state of emergency in May 2013. This time state-wide
emergency rules were declared in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe. From May 2013 onwards,
however, due to legislation passed by the House of Representatives, it was ruled illegal for
the government to withhold FAAC funds from local governments even in the case of an
emergency rule.13 Thus, subsequent emergency rules did no longer affect allocations. The
emergency rules in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe were extended two times in November
2013, and in May 2014, each time for six months as prescribed by law. President Jonathan
wanted to enact another extension of the state of emergency in November 2014, but this
time the National Assembly did approve it, ending it by then.
There are two other cases preceding the 2013 legislation in which emergency rule may
have impacted allocations – though we were unable to find a record of this. The first one
was in Plateau state lasting from 18 May to 17 November 2004. The second case was an
emergency rule in Ekiti state lasting from 19 October 2006 to 18 April 2007. In both cases,
13An unverified claim by Adamawa’s governor that funds were still withheld for security operations in
August 2013, could not be verified
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President Obasanjo tried to extend the emergency rule for an additional 6 months, but
the National Assembly didn’t approve neither extension (emergency rules have a legal
default duration of 6 months).
The overarching observation is that withholding has been rare, quite narrow in time
and space, they only implied a delay in cash flows and in most cases were deemed un-
constitutional and were not upheld by law.
Unverified claims of deductions To have a better understanding of deductions made
at source from the joint revenue accounts, we conduct a media content analysis of all rel-
evant newspaper articles that mention the withholding or deduction of allocations. The
media content analysis reveals claims that in some instances parts of the local government
allocations are withheld or deducted at source before they reach the local government ac-
counts. Claims often mention deductions related to so-called joint projects. Since the
Nigerian constitution is not very clear about the responsibilities of state and local gov-
ernments in the provision of public goods and services, state governors exploit that lack
of clarity to implement “state-local government joint-projects”. These joint-projects are
a way for state governors to exercise more control over the local government resources.
While the funds used for joint projects are still likely to benefit the local government ar-
eas, it is often reported that the joint-projects are ripe of corruption and funds siphoned
off both by state and local governors. As corruption at the state and local government
level are a huge problem, the joint-projects are a way of obscuring the use of allocations.
A second type of deductions made are statutory deductions. These are small percent-
ages of the funds that are deducted before disbursements are made to the local govern-
ments. The funds sourced from the deductions are used for all kinds of projects. These
can include the funding of councils of traditional rulers or religious rulers, joint expendi-
tures for security forces, infrastructure projects like roads, and joint education and health
projects. While funds used for joint projects are diverted before they reach the local gov-
ernment’s account, it seems that these moneys still reach the local government areas in
the form of some project expenditure, just not through the local government account.
Based on our additional in-depth media content analysis, we identified 79 cases of
(illegal) deduction claims. Of these, 21 claims were not specific enough to determine
with some certainty a time period when deductions were made. We do not include these
unspecified claims in our coding. For five states we did not identify any deduction claims.
We cannot identify any cases where allocations were withheld entirely by the state
government over an extended period of time. Thus, even when deductions are made,
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there are still allocations flowing to the local governments’ accounts in any case. Neither
can we find any evidence that deductions are made directly related to political violence.
Finally, in many cases the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) was in-
vestigating cases of illegal deductions from the allocations. Accordingly, the EFCC holds
state governments accountable – at least within its legal capabilities.14
Results are robust to dropping data that may have been affected by withholding
We have coded up the instances in which allocations may have been temporarily withheld
and test to what extent the results are sensitive to the exclusion of data from LGAs that
may have been impacted by this. We present the results in appendix table A9. This table
presents the results from the main estimating equation dropping successively more data
from states that may have been impacted by temporary withholding.
Specifically, in Panel A, we drop all state by month observations in which there may
have been withholding of allocations. The column head indicates the instances or cases.
Column (5) drops all state by month observations that may have been impacted. In Panel
B, we drop all data from all states and years in which there may have been a single month
in which allocations may have been withheld. That is, for example, the emergency rule
due to the Boko Haram insurgency that started in January 2012 (declared December 31,
2011) and lasted until June 2012 we drop all observations from Borno, Yobe, Niger and
Plateau in 2012.
Lastly, in Panel C, we drop all data pertaining to all states for which there ever was a
potential issue with withholding of allocations. This is a very conservative way of tackling
this potential issue and amounts to dropping 26% of the estimating sample in column (5).
Throughout, the results are very similar suggesting that the relationship between rents
and conflict becomes notably weaker when local governments are elected (as opposed
to appointed). This is also relevant given the concern about the role of Boko Haram.
Effectively what is done in Panel C, column (4) of the new Table A9, we drop all data
pertaining to the states Adamawa, Borno, Niger, Plateau and Yobe. This highlights that
the results are robust to dropping data pertaining to states in which allocations may have
been withheld.
14For instance, in 2006 the Senate directed the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and
the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Comission (ICPC) to investigate allegations
that the Imo state government deducted 5-6 million Naira monthly from each local government to tar 4km
of road in each local government (This Day/All Africa Global Media).
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B.3 Violent contest for institutionalized rents
Nigeria is in a state of low-intensity conflict. Generally small scale violent events cause
numerous casualties each year. We propose that these kinds conflicts are – to a large extent
– contests between political factions for the control over local governments. The control of
local government councils brings with it the perks of the allocations from the Federation
Account. The poor management and outright embezzlement of public funds, that are
likely transferred to the group who holds power instead of used for public goods provi-
sion, create grievances within the local population. It may thus lead opposition groups
to invest in violence to contest for their share of the oil revenue pie. In the following,
we provide anecdotal evidence for these low-intensity conflicts over the institutionalized
rents across Nigeria.
One case of such low-intensity conflict is reported in the newspaper This Day about
violent incidences in Afikpo and Ivo local governments, Ebonyi State. Several cases of
gross misconduct and malpractice of local government officers triggered off protest, lead
to the destruction of property and the murder of a prominent businessman, the Divi-
sional Police Officer (DPO) in charge of Ivo local government, and the vice principal of a
secondary school. It finally developed into a “full-blown” conflict. The newspaper article
also suggests that governing politicians should stop to use state resources and machin-
ery to hound and intimidate perceived opponents (This Day, 18 September, 2001). The
communal conflicts in Ebonyi state continued, as reported by the newspaper Vanguard in
October 2008. The newspaper described how the upsurge in violence between commu-
nities in the state can be traced to the monthly allocations from the Federation Account
(Vanguard, 28 October, 2008).
Further evidence of violence related to public misuse of funds is reported by Human
Rights Watch (2007) for Khana and Etche local governments, Rivers State. In Khana, po-
litical opponents tried to remove the chairman from office, yet failed, which again created
an increased level of violence and insecurity. In 2006, opposition forces burnt down a part
of the new local government secretariat in a night-time attack. The very public revolt has
helped to cast light on the rampant government malfeasance and its impact on the health
and education sectors. The chairman was accused of having channelled large sums of
money into dubious or non-existent projects, and that he also passed some of that money
on to thugs to enforce his will in Khana (Albin-Lackey, 2007).
In Etche local government, chairman Nwuzi was elected into office in 2004. By the
end of 2005, local government councillors charged him of misappropriating a large por-
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tion of what they called “huge monthly allocations to the council”. Their grievances were
also triggered by the alleged failure to pay salaries and other allowances that were due to
them. Councillors also accused the chairman of using “thugs equipped with dangerous
weapons” to intimidate them into abandoning their request to get their share of the al-
locations paid into to local governments account in the first 18 months of the chairman’s
office (Albin-Lackey, 2007, p. 64). According to the report, local councillors were even
forced by thugs, also known as the chairman’s “boys”, to sign loyalty oaths to stop asking
for their share of the accounts. Apparently, the local government chairman Nwuzi had
to pay large amounts of the monthly allocations to his political “godfather”, the Rivers
State Commissioner for Sport who helped him to win office. When the chairman had to
flee after a heated confrontation with local residents over the replacement of an electrical
transformer, he apparently shot wildly into the crowd killing one person (Albin-Lackey,
2007, p. 65).
Overall, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence of violence related to the contest over
resource rents disbursed to local governments as monthly allocations from the Federation
Account. Violence is reported to be associated with the misconduct of local government
chairmen and their failure to provide education and health services, mismanagement of
local public finances such as omission of paying salaries, or the embezzlement of public
funds. The acts of fraud provokes violent reactions by opposing political groups who
want to claim their share of the pie. Even the Boko Haram conflict is reported to be
related to local government mismanagement by observers, as we argue in great detail in
the following section B.4.
B.4 Case study: Boko Haram contesting political power
Boko Haram’s investments in violence and struggle for political power do actually fit
astoundingly well with the logic of political violence (Besley and Persson, 2011). The sect
was founded in opposition to a corrupt local political elite that would transfer rents to
their own political factions and patronage networks. These incumbent transfers created
grievances and frustration among large parts of the population which again fuelled sup-
port for Boko Haram – until they turned more terrorist after 2009. Yet, Boko Haram also
benefited from direct links to an incumbent local government chairman who likely made
transfers to the sect for several years. In the following, we describe the case in sufficient
detail.
Access to and exclusion from political power Historically, the rivalries and struggle
for access to state power between different factions of Islam, but also between Muslims
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and Christians in Northern Nigeria have been evolving over centuries and continuously
led to violent conflicts (De Montclos, 2015). Islamic dissenters were long excluded from
society.15 The 1903 British conquest destroyed the Sokoto Caliphate in Borno and neigh-
boring states, which was itself the result of the Usman Dan Fodio Jihad in the early 19th
century. The British reformed the justice system by downgrading the Islamic Sharia law,
secularized the state, and introduced a Western education system. The Uluma, scholars
and intelligentsia of Islamic societies, were marginalized and alienated from government
under colonialism. Muslims with Western education became the new dominant elite that
inherited power and resources from the British at the end of colonial rule in 1960 (Wakili,
2009).
Four decades later, it was the transition to democracy in 1999 that produced again
a new political elite across Nigeria, commanding considerable financial resources (Inter-
national Crisis Group, 2010). These newly elected politicians were often in conflict and
competition with traditional religious leaders, challenging their authority and struggling
over the implementation of Sharia law. One religious group trying to gain influence was
Jama’atu Ahlis-Sunnah Lidda’awati Wal Jihad (“People Committed to the Propagation of the
Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad”) that became later known as Boko Haram.16 The new
incumbent elite that rose to power in 1999 was seen as bringing all the vices of “Western”
civilization and governance.17 Boko Haram’s primary motive was to expose and root out
that corruption by taking over power at local and state governments.
It is common for political office holders to maintain close affiliations with various
religious groups that form their electorates, because that is how they yield and secure
political power (Alkali et al., 2012). From the early days of Boko Haram, its founder
Mohammed Yusuf benefited from close connections to people in local governments that
supported his cause. A close associate of Muhammed Yusuf was Alhaji Buji Foi, a two-
time council chairman of Kaga local government18 in Borno state. As local government
15See e.g. LSE blog post “Long before Boko Haram, dissenters were driven to the brink in Northern
Nigeria”, published on 14 January 2015 [link]).
16In 2002, Muhammed Yusuf, an early follower of the Sahaba group (“The Prophet’s Companions”,
founded in 1995) increasingly gets in conflict with the Sahaba group’s leaders, and separates part of the
Sahaba group to found Boko Haram (De Montclos, 2015, p. 237).
17Boko Haram does not in any way mean “Western Education is a forbidden” as the media often explains
its name. Boko Haram actually means “Western Civilisation” is forbidden. The difference is that while the
first gives the impression that Boko Haram is opposed to formal education coming from the West – which
is not true–, the second affirms its members’ belief in the supremacy of Islamic culture (not education), for
culture is broader, it includes education but is not determined by Western Education. (Vanguard 2009, cited
in Onuoha (2014)).
18Kaga local government area in Borno state has continuously been a focal point of Boko Haram
attacks and remains so until today. See e.g. https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/fact-finding-mission-
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chairman, Buji Foi had access to local government allocations and he used these resources
to employ political thugs affiliated with Boko Haram to help Ali Modu Sheriff win the
governorship election of 2003.
Through its activities and investments in violence (see below) Boko Haram secured
direct access to local and state government power until around 2008. Only the extra-
judicial execution of its leader, Muhamed Yusuf, and its closest ally in government, Alhaji
Buji Foi, in 2009 further radicalized the sect and turned it into the terrorist group that
we know today. Although it can’t be proven, the killing of Yusuf and Buji Foi happened
under the watch of governor Sheriff and by his police forces. It was likely ordered to
eliminate any evidence as to the financing and links of Boko Haram to the local and state
governments. Had Boko Haram had continuing access to local government power and
funds, it may have remained the type of armed religious militia that it was before 2009.
Nonetheless, still in 2012 Nigeria’s President Goodluck Jonathan said that Boko Haram
has infiltrated the executive, parliamentary, and judicial wings of government (Reinert
and Garçon, 2014).
Investments in violence through rents and conscripting Boko Haram has invested in
violence to contest resources and battle for politicians to win office. Investments in vio-
lence are financed both through government transfers and private contributions. In return
for armed support, politicians financed its cause, promising various endowments. Since
Alhaji Buji Foi was an incumbent local government chairman, Boko Haram can be com-
prehended as an investment in his private militia. In 2003, Ali Modu Sheriff challenged
the incumbent governor Mala Kachalla (Reinert and Garçon, 2014). Thugs linked to Boko
Haram were hired to help win the governorship election. Confirming these investments
in violence, a 2011 government report traced the origins of private militias in Borno state,
of which Boko Haram is an off-shoot, to politicians (i.e. Alhaji Buji Foi) who set them
up in the run-up to the 2003 general elections (reported by Premium Times, 4 September
2014).19 Sheriff reportedly promised Boko Haram strict implementation of Sharia law, 50
million Naira reward, 50 motorcycles and the office of the Commissioner for Religious Af-
fairs in exchange for their support (Onuoha, 2014). Since Sheriff’s campaign succeeded,
governor Sheriff soon after inauguration created a new Ministry for Religious Affairs, and
appointed Buji Foi as its pioneer commissioner.
communities-kaga-and-konduga-lgas-23-february-2016.
19Goodluck Jonathan Administration had set up the Ambassador Usman Galtimari Panel in August 2011
to investigate the genesis of the insurgency in the North East. See the Premium Times article “How Ex-Gov
Modu Sheriff sponsored Boko Haram” by Femi Falana, Sahara Reporters, published 4 September 2014.
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Boko Haram became such an important armed actor in the region that it was seen as
untouchable by the authorities and of immense importance to the political actors hold-
ing the reins of government (Alozieuwa, 2016). Militias, including the ‘Yusufiyya’ (Boko
Harma with Yusuf Mohammed as its leader) and ‘ECOMOG’ in Borno, ‘Yan Kalare’ in
Gombe, and ‘Sara Suka’ in Bauchi, had strong links to prominent politicians, were armed
with sophisticated weapons and used extensively as political thugs. Investments in vio-
lence by politicians is hence prevalent, and Boko Haram is not different from other armed
militias (at least during our study period).
Boko Haram benefited not only from government patronage, it also collected “taxes”
from supporters by promising them to take (back) power. It seems that it was able to solve
the collective action problem of taxing/conscripting citizens as described in the Besley
Persson model. Alozieuwa (2016) reports that people sold their belongings in order to
contribute financially to save Islam from the corrupt Western governance influence and
domination. According to Onuoha (2014), politicians, government officials, businessmen
and other individuals, who believed in the teachings of Boko Haram to impose a less
corrupt Islamic governance (within the Nigerian federal governance structures), have also
been a source of funding for Boko Haram.20
Between 2003 and 2007, Boko Haram regularly attacked local police stations and gov-
ernment buildings (Reinert and Garçon, 2014). Security forces often went on a rampage
to retaliate against the slaying of soldiers or policemen. When Yusuf started preaching
about a violent take-over of political power, local chairman Buji Foi, however, distanced
himself and stopped following his teachings. In the same year 2007, Buji Foi also fell out
with governor Sheriff and resigned as commissioner of the Ministry for Religious Affairs
under dubious circumstances.21 He retired to his farm and later left the political stage.22
Following the shooting of 14 of its followers in a joint military and police operation
in Borno State in 2009, Boko Haram launched a counter attack, which was quelled by a
military crackdown that allegedly left more than 800 dead – mostly sect members and
civilians (Reinert and Garçon, 2014). On July 30, 2009, Mohamed Yusuf was arrested by
the Nigerian military as part of the joint security operation and handed-over to the local
20For instance, on 21 November 2011, state security operatives arrested a serving senator representing
Borno South Senatorial District, Mohammed Ali Ndume, who was subsequently arraigned before an Abuja
High Court for ties with and sponsorship of Boko Haram (Abonyi, This Day, 2011 cited in Onuoha (2014)).
21See the Prince newspaper article for a more detailed account: “Boko Haram: why Buji Fai, sect’s
financier, was executed”, August 9, 2009.
22According to Wikileaks, Buji Foi became local governor only during Sheriff’s first term and remained
in office as Kaga local government chairman until December 2008, thus some information is conflicting, see
https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/50/5013218 buji-foi-.html.
88
Nigerian police. He was executed extra-judicially on the same day.23 Just one day later,
on July 31, 2009, former local chairman and commissioner Buji Foi was arrested by police
as well.24 He was then also extra-judicially killed in policy custody by police officers, to-
gether with dozens of other individuals.25 Several well-informed security sources believe
that Yusuf’s and Foi’s killings were ordered to eliminate any information concerning the
support they had previously received from local political authorities (International Crisis
Group, 2010). In the aftermath of the killings, Boko Haram members engaged in a se-
ries of targeted assassinations on individuals directly related to the crackdown or those
suspected of having provided information or support to the operation (Serrano and Pieri,
2014).
The uprising and counter operations by the military ushered in a new evolution of
the sect, one that embraced the far more violent tendencies of its new leader, Abubakar
Shekau (Serrano and Pieri, 2014). Shekau’s ascension to power led to further investments
in violence and a subsequent rapid escalation. The Joint Task Force (JTF) appointed to
counter Boko Haram committed unlawful violence. According to witnesses, the JTF has
engaged in excessive use of force, physical abuse, secret detentions, extortion, burning
of houses, stealing money during raids, and extra-judicial killings of suspects (Human
Rights Watch, 2012).26 The widespread human rights abuses and indiscriminate crack-
downs in the North further alienated an already sceptical local population (Serrano and
Pieri, 2014).
Transfers to incumbent groups cause grievances One of the primary motives of Boko
Haram was to call out and expose corruption among political groups in power. Corrup-
tion in this context are transfers by incumbent politicians to their patronage networks
and religious or ethnic groups. Since the grievances were felt across large swaths of pop-
ulation, the sect could easily recruit new members, facilitated by dire job opportunities
(low opportunity costs). The profitable transfers to other groups and the low levels of
public good provisions by incumbent governments made contesting power all the more
beneficial.
Yet, as described above, for several years Boko Haram was itself benefiting from po-
23The extra-judicial killing of Mohamed Yusuf is reported and shown in this Al Jazeera video:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tlpZr8IRUcY (Warning: viewer discretion is advised).
24The reports on the exact dates of Buji Foi’s and Yusuf’s executions are conflicting.
25Alhaji Buji Foi’s apparent execution was recorded on video and published on Youtube
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N m4PBSzU7Y (Warning: viewer discretion is advised.).
26Find the Human Rights Watch 2012 report here:
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/nigeria1012webwcover 0.pdf.
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litical incumbency. In 2003, Yusuf was permitted to develop a compound with a mosque
and a Quranic school in Maiduguri (Reinert and Garçon, 2014).27 Boko Haram benefited
from government allocations being doled out as patronage to religious organizations in
return for staying non-violent. Buji Foi as commissioner for Religious Affairs was directly
responsible for paying extortion fees to religious leaders.28
Whether Boko Haram could have been included in a non-violent political process of
improved government representation, is rather speculative at this point. According to
our findings though, the better inclusion of Boko Haram and other excluded ethnic and
religious groups in local governments of northern Nigeria would likely have drastically
reduced violence.
B.5 The role of local government elections
The Nigerian Constitution of 1999 stipulates that local government councils must be
elected by the people (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999). Even though the federal struc-
ture of governance includes three tiers of government, the constitution gives the state
governments considerable influence over the organization and regulation of local govern-
ment council elections. The main problem with the constitutional provision guaranteeing
local elections is that it treats the local governments not rigorously as an independent
tier of government. In this section we provide some additional context regarding local
government elections and how they involve political violence.
In contrast to the Independent National Electoral Commission that supervises the gen-
eral elections, State Independent Electoral Commissions are appointed by the state gov-
ernment. It is the body to organize, undertake, and supervise local government elections.
It consists of a chairman and no less than five but not more than seven other members
(Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999). Furthermore, the state government is also responsible
for providing the financing for the conduct of local council elections so that local officials
hinge on the intentions and decisions of the governor.
The first post-autocratic local government councils elections were successfully held in
November/December 1998 in all local government areas as a preparation of the demo-
cratic presidential elections in February 1999. This marked the end of military rule and the
transition to civilian rule. After the first term of the initially elected local councils ended
27According to Alozieuwa (2016), the compound in Maiduguri was at times lined with exotic cars that
belonged to powerful individuals who would arrive with tinted glasses that shielded them from easy
identification when visiting Yusuf. The same compound was apparently also used for militant activities.
28See Prince, 9 August 2009, “Boko Haram: Why Buji Foi, sect’s financier was executed”. According
to this article, Ministries for Religious Affairs in Northern Nigeria primarily have the purpose of keeping
good liaisons with religious groups.
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in May 2002, confusion emerged as the national voter register was not updated. Accord-
ing to the Supreme Court an updated voter register was a prerequisite to conduct local
elections. As a consequence, in June 2002 most state governors appointed so-called ‘care-
taker’ or ‘transition committees’ to (temporarily) run the local governments. Ever since
that decisive moment in 2002 when caretaker committees were appointed, the election of
local governments became a political controversy.29 Only in 2004, most state governments
held local government elections again once the voter register was updated. Yet, a number
of states found all sorts of reasons not to hold local elections and henceforth appointed
caretaker committees in the subsequent years. Henceforth, the local government councils
were in many cases not elected bodies of government anymore, but appointed bodies
in many instances, exhibiting substantial variation across states. While some states, like
Cross River or Enugu, local government council elections have been held (almost) consis-
tently throughout the period from 2004 to 2014, and hence were more democratic in that
sense, other states like Ondo or Yobe state had appointed caretaker committees for the
larger part of that same period (see Panels C and D in Figure 2).
We draw data on the conduct of local government council elections or appointment
of caretaker committees from a media content analysis using Nigerian Newspapers, pre-
sented in more detail in Kyburz (2018). Since official information on local councils is not
available, we have to resort on media outlets, to gather a consistent picture about local
governance in the 774 local government areas. The newspaper articles are collected in the
FACTIVA media data base.30 From local Nigerian newspaper articles, we extract informa-
tion on local government council elections.31 By using a series of keywords, it is possible
to determine for each of the 774 local government areas the date when local elections
were held, the tenure of elected councils, and the periods when caretaker committees
were appointed.
While some local government councils are elected and others appointed, the quality of
the conduct of local elections also varies considerably across states. Importantly, we argue
and provide evidence that elected local governments are more cohesive than appointed
local governments. Nonetheless, even among the elected local government councils, in-
29See Kyburz (2018) for a more detailed description of the controversy surrounding local government
council elections and the appointment of caretaker committees.
30The FACTIVA media data base is a product by Dow Jones and contains news articles and information
from over 9’000 international, national and regional news publications out of 152 countries, including
several Nigerian newspapers.
31Most information is extracted from Nigerian newspapers This Day/All Africa Global Media, Daily Cham-
pion/All Africa Global Media, Vanguard/All Africa Global Media, Daily Trust/All Africa Global Media, and Daily
Independent/All Africa Global Media.
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stitutions may be more or less democratic. While elections into the local government
councils were reported to be frequently not free and fair, Kyburz (2018) describes in more
detail how the conduct of local government elections is indeed an important possibility
for opposition groups to compete for power. Local elections seem to intensify the for-
mation of political parties as opposition groups make strategic choices to compete. In
many cases, the major incumbent and opposition parties hold primary elections, which
adds another layer of contesting power. The local elections elevate the political competi-
tion both within and among parties. Local elections likely increase the voters’ awareness
about local struggles for power and representation. In many cases, election tribunals are
instituted post election where complaints can be deposited and the tribunals have to rule
over the validity of election results. Opposition parties often addressed the tribunals to
contest the election results when they feel disadvantaged over the incumbent party.
The local electoral democracy thus differs in quality across states and competing
power in local councils may be easier in some states than in others. How “free and
fair” elections are and whether opposition groups have a fair chance of competing likely
also has an effect on whether violence erupts in the months around elections. Civil vio-
lence and riots are often related to elections, be they general elections or local government
elections. Figure A1 in the appendix depicts a surge in violence around local government
council elections. Local elections thus seem to be a trigger event for violence when oppo-
sition parties perceive that elections are not held in a free and fair manner and demand
a level playing field. The event of a local election may in this case be an opportunity for
political factions to show their force using violent means if necessary.32 In this paper we
focus on the systematic violence that is not specifically related to elections, but happens
throughout the term periods of local politicians.
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